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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST:
PLEADING AND MAINTAINING A TITLE VII
CLASS ACTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
RESOLVING THE CLAIMS OF CLASS MEMBERS
DAVID G. KARRO*
"It is undoubtedly true that many federal district judges have been careless in their
dealings with class actions, and have failed to comply carefully with the technical
requirements of Rule 23." **
INTRODUCTION
T ITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' autho-
rizes employees of certain employers, and members of certain
unions, to file civil actions against those employers or unions if
they claim to have been the victims of discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin-' Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizes plaintiffs who can meet certain require-
ments to bring their civil actions on behalf of a class of persons with
claims similar to theirs. 3 Neither the statute nor the rule refers to
the other. Early in the history of Title VII, however, the courts noted
an apparent relation between the Title VII requirement that a plain-
tiff establish an injury suffered because of membership in a protected
class and the rule 23 requirement that a putative class representative
establish the existence of a class with claims the court can adjudicate.
"Racial discrimination," the Fifth Circuit held in a 1968 Title VII case
involving rule 23, "is by definition class discrimination." 4 A year
later, the Seventh Circuit concurred, noting that the purpose of a
Title VII action is to end discrimination on the basis of class
© David G. Karro 1981.
* Senior Attorney with the Office of Labor Law, United States Postal Service.
B.A. 1964, Oberlin College; J.D. 1969, University of Wisconsin. Mr. Karro has had
extensive experience in the litigation of Title VII class actions. The author wishes to
thank Ms. Wyneva Johnson for her assistance and advice in the preparation of this
Article. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of the United States Postal Service.
** Board of Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 133 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
2. Id. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-16(c). Section 2000-5 also authorized actions against
state and local governments. For convenience, actions under that section will be
referred to as "private-sector" actions, as opposed to actions under § 2000e-16(c),
which must be against a federal agency.
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
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characteristics.5 Most of the other circuits have adopted this
reasoning.6 As a result, it has become routine for Title VII plaintiffs
to invoke rule 23. Moreover, it is generally conceded that pleading
causes of action under the statute entitles these plaintiffs to invoke
the rule-or at least to a sympathetic hearing on their request to do
SO.' Little additional analysis of the nature of the relationship be-
tween the statute and the rule appears to be evident.
On its face, such an uncritical attitude toward the use of rule 23 is
surprising because of the pervasive influence of class action judg-
ments. When a court allows an action to proceed as a class action, "it
is contemplated that all members of the class will be bound by the
ultimate ruling on the merits."' This suggests that a plaintiff seeking
certification 9 of a class is doing something more than merely seeking
to enforce Title VII. He is asking to be allowed to act as a spokesman
for people who may never have heard of him, and to bind those
people through his advocacy whether he prevails or not."' If the
court allows him to act on their behalf, the named plaintiff acquires a
fiduciary obligation to protect the interests of the class "1 that he
shares with the class attorney.' 2  The trial court also acquires an
obligation to ensure that the interests of the class members are
protected.13 It would, therefore, be reasonable to expect that re-
5. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
6. E.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, IAMAW, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d
714, 719 (1st Cir. 1977); Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local 30, 549
F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1977); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340
(10th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Ciri, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d
Cir. 1971).
7. E.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs. Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir ('[a]s parties
who have allegedly been aggrieved by some of [their employer's] discriminatory
practices, plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient nexus to enable them to represent
other class members suffering from different practices motivated by the same poli-
cies"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 718 (7th
Cir. 1976) ("[c]lass action status is particularly appropriate in a case involving class
discrimination").
8. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
9. A court that permits an action brought as a class action to proceed as such is
said to have "certified" the class. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 125 (1976).
10. EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264, 1268 (5th Cir. 1978).
11. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978); Charal v. Andes, 81
F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 131,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Folding Cartons, Inc. v. American Can Co.. 79 F.R.D. 698,
703 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 78 F.R.D. 675. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
12. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 834-35 (9th Cir.
1976); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973); Grimm
v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977). Gru-
nin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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sponsible lawyers, contemplating acting as fiduciaries for large num-
bers of people whose actual needs can only be surmised, would pro-
ceed by preparing carefully drafted class pleadings that define with
precision the persons who will be represented and the claims that
will be advocated. Such preparation, however, has seldom been evi-
dent in the reported cases.
Given the potential for prejudice in class actions, it seems
appropriate to ask whether Congress intended to create a situation in
which any person with a claim that he has been the victim of discri-
mination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin
is, for that reason -alone, entitled to act as a rule 23 fiduciary for any
other person alleging a similar injury. 14 The absent members of an
alleged class15 have the same right to be heard on their own behalf
that anyone else has. That right should be denied only because a
court is satisfied that these class members will not be prejudiced by
that denial, not because the named plaintiff's cause of action arises
under a particular statute. 16
I. WEAVING THE NET: CONSTRUING RULE 23
TO CREATE CLASSES FROM WHICH CLASS MEMBERS CANNOT ESCAPE
A. The Purpose of a Class Certification Order
Prior to 1966, rule 23 provided for what was known as a "spurious"
class action. The judgment of the court did not bind members of such
423 U.S. 864 (1975); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir.
1973).
14. For an analysis of the legislative history of Title VII on this point, see
Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 688, 704-06 (1980).
15. Absent class members, who are unnamed persons whom the named plaintiff
wishes to represent, may be bound by the judgment of a trial court, benefit from the
tolling of the statute of limitations, and have standing to appeal decisions and to
object to settlements. 2 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 2830, at 1259-60 (1977); see
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 342 n.1 (1980) (Stephens, J.,
concurring); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 344 (1978); United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 392-95 (1977); Pensan v. Terminal Trans-
port Co., 634 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1981); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D.
539, 541 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
16. "The broad brush approach of some of the Title VII cases is in sharp contrast
to the diligence with which in other areas we carefully protect those whose rights
may be affected by litigation. If this were an individual cross-action against an em-
ployee at one of appellee's remote terminals we would turn intellectual handsprings
over questions of notice and process to him and opportunity to protect his
interests-such issues as whether the marshal dropped the notice at the door or
handed it to the child at the front gate. But when the problem is multiplied many-
fold, counsel, and at times the courts, are moving blithely ahead tacitly assuming all
will be well for surely the plaintiff will win and manna will fall on all members of the
class. It is not quite that easy." Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring); accord, Rowe v. Bailar,
20 FEP Cases (BNA) 912, 914 (D.D.C. 1979).
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a class unless they agreed to be bound-and they could wait until
after judgment to decide.17 In American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah,8 the Supreme Court characterized this ability of class members
to "await developments in the trial or even final judgment on the
merits in order to determine whether participation would be favor-
able to their interests" as an "abuse."19 It held that "[tjhe 1966
amendments [to the rule are] designed, in part, specifically to mend
this perceived defect in the former rule and to assure that members
of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would
be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments." ' The Court
believed that the mechanism for achieving that result is the current
rule 23(c)(1), which requires that "a determination whether an action
shall be maintained as a class action [be] made by the court '[a]s soon
as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action."'' Thus, when a putative class representative files a com-
plaint indicating his intention to represent a class, his ability to do so
must be determined before he can require the defendant to defend
on the merits.2Y A defendant need litigate only against those class
members who will be bound by the result.
This reading of American Pipe receives considerable support from
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,n in which the Supreme Court reversed
a trial court's decision to order a defendant to pay 90% of the cost of
pre-judgment notice to the class. The lower court had arrived at that
decision following a pre-certification hearing that demonstrated the
plaintiff "was more than likely" to prevail on the merits of the class
claim. The Supreme Court thought the trial court had erred by allowv-
ing the plaintiff to present the merits of the case before
certification.' The logic of American Pipe suggests that the mistake
17. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1789, at
177 (1970).
18. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
19. Id. at 547.
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
22. "In order to give clear definition to the action, [Rule 23(c)(1)] requires the
court to determine, as early in the proceedings as may be practicable, whether an
action brought as a class action is to be so maintained." Proposed Amendments,
Advisory Comm. Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Amendments].
23. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
24. Id. at 177-78. Specifically, the Court stated that "[w]c find nothing in either
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by
allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first
satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby allowed to obtain a determination on
the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a
class action may be maintained. This prodecure is directly contrary to the command
1981]
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of the Eisen trial court was to allow the plaintiff to put in issue the
claims of people who were not yet committed to abide by the out-
come of the litigation. A putative class representative who can force a
preliminary adjudication of the class claim before a determination of
his ability to represent the class is in a position to abandon all, or
part of, the class if he discovers he may not prevail.13
Although the Supreme Court appears to view the primary objective
of rule 23 as the simultaneous disposition of multiple claims, regard-
less of merit,' many lower courts view the rule as a device for ensur-
ing that persons with meritorious claims obtain their just due.27
"Once a court is convinced that a plaintiff's claims are of substantial
merit, and that the class action device is the most practicable method
of vindication," the Third Circuit has said, "it must not allow encoun-
tered procedural difficulties to obviate its responsibility to adjudicate
those claims." 2 This view has been widely accepted in Title VII
litigation.' Because trial courts acting in accordance with that view
of subdivision (c)(1) that the court determine whether a suit denominated a class
action may be maintained as such '[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement
of [the] action . ..' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)).
25. For an example of a Title VII action in which pre-certification proceedings
apparently led the defendant to seek expansion of the alleged class and the plaintiff
to seek contraction, see Godbolt v. Hughes Tool Co., 63 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
26. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336-40 (1980).
27. Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 155 (10th Cir. 1972) ("the
[trial] court's [refusal to certify] could well have been predicated on the lack of evi-
dence to establish a pervasive practice or policy of plant wide discrimination"); Cas-
tro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972) (because the plaintiffs had failed to
establish certain claims, "[t]he district court was within its discretion in treating
those as individual rather than class claims"); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968) (class certification required because "if class-wide relief were
not afforded expressly in any injunction or declaratory order issued in Employee's
behalf, the result would be the incongruous one of the Court-a Federal Court, no
less-itself being the instrument of racial discrimination"). But see Kahan v. Rosen-
steil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.) ("[a] suit may be a proper class action, conforming
to Rule 23, and still be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action"), cert. dniled,
398 U.S. 950 (1970).
28. Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1976).
29. See pt. III(B) infra. Lim v. Citizens Say. and Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 802,
807-10 (N.D. Cal. 1976), is an example of a rare attempt to reconcile the Supreme
Court's admonition against determining the merits of the class claim prior to certi-
fication with the practice of many courts of requiring Title VII plaintiffs seeking class
certification to establish a likelihood of success at trial. The Lim court required the
plaintiff to make a prima facie case at the certification hearing, noting that Elsen may
prevent a defendant from rebutting such a showing at the certification stage, as
"further consideration of the issue might have resulted in an inquiry into the merits
of the type precluded by Eisen." Id. at 809-10. The Lim plaintiff was allowed con-
siderable discovery before being required to prove her prima facie case. Because
discovery must inevitably lead to an exploration of the defendant's position, Lim
[Vol. 49
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cannot be indifferent to the merits of class claims when they consider
certification, they have had to develop techniques that permit com-
pliance with the rule 23(c)(1) requirement for decisions on certifica-
tion early in the litigation, and still retain the ability to determine
class membership after the merits of the class members' claims are
known.
This result is commonly achieved through certification of a tenta-
tive class that will be modified at a later date. Indeed, it has been
said that if a trial court "[chooses] to rule on class certification at an
early stage of the litigation before the supporting facts are fully de-
veloped, then it should err 'in favor and not against the maintenance
of the class action, for [the decision] is always subject to
modification.""'3 The language of rule 23(c)(1) appears to authorize
such an approach. Although this subdivision requires an early deci-
sion on maintainability, it also states that "[a]n order under this sub-
division may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits." 12 The result, however, nullifies the
holding of American Pipe. When an employer successfully defends
against the claims of class members only to discover that the class has
been decertified, he has been subjected to something very much like
a "spurious" class action,n even though it is the court that released
the class members, not the class members who opt out. The court
leads to the conclusion that only the court must be kept ignorant of the defendant's
defenses during certification hearings. The plaintiff continues to have the ability to
test the claims of putative class members and shape the class definition accordingly.
30. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1950);
Social Servs. Union Local 535 v. County of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 948-49 (9th
Cir. 1979); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1977);
McLaughlin v. Wohlgemuth, 552 F.2d 691, 697-98 (6th Cir. 1977); Duncan v. Ten-
nessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 28 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dept., 82 F.R.D.
379, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Karin v. Nabisco Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 407 (W.D. Pa.
1978).
31. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1098 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Esplin v.
Hirshi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969)).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). But see Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 16
FEP Cases (BNA) 242 (D.D.C. 1977). "Although rule 23(c)(1) permits conditional
certification, that provision should not be allowed to bypass rule 23(a) requirements.
Instead, it is more properly used to redefine or to decertify a class which originally
was determined to be proper but which subsequently is found to be improper. The
courts should not permit it to be used as a sword by which plaintiff engages defen-
dant in virtually unlimited and burdensome discovery until she succeeds in finding
other invidivuals who have claims similar to hers." Id. at 245. See also Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 42 (1967).
33. See Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526 (W.D. La. 1976),
aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1979). The district court certified a doubtful class on
the theory that "if an error should be made with regard to class status at an early
stage, the court should err in favor of maintenance of a class action." Id. at 530. The
class representative lost at trial, and the court, dissatisfied with his advocacy of the
class claim, revoked certification. Id. at 533, 544.
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did not envision that the final ruling on the merits would bind all
class members when it certified the class,-" and it thereby permitted a
determination of the merits of the class claims without any assurance
that a class action could be maintained.-3
Another technique that provides for early certification while still
postponing final determination of class membership is to define the
class in terms of the merits of the claim to be litigated. Instead of
certifying a class of all blacks with specific factual claims, the court
allows the plaintiff to define the class in terms of broad allegations of
discrimination such as all blacks "who have been . . . denied employ-
ment ... because of their race."31 The representative of such a class
is not committed to represent a specific group of applicants with
claims of unknown merit, but is allowed to represent any applicants
with claims he thinks he can prove. After trial, applicants with claims
who have not prevailed cannot be persons found to have been "de-
nied employment . . . because of their race," and, at least in theory,
should not be members of the class bound by the judgment of the
court.
The most sophisticated technique for certifying broad classes with-
out the risk of binding class members to an unfavorable judgment is
to treat the class as a party litigant in its own right, with interests
distinct from those of its members.' If the class litigant prevails on
34. But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
35. But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
36. Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Bolton v.
Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1977) ("all blacks who 'are
barred or terminated or may be barred or terminated from employment or otherwise
discriminated against in terms of employment with defendant solely because of their
race"'); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 272
(N.D. Ill. 1978) ("all Latinos who, because of their race, national origin or opposition
to defendants' unlawful employment practices have been or are denied equal em-
ployment opportunities by the defendants through (1) refusal to consider or hire
[qualified] Latinos .... (2) discriminatory assignment of Latino employees, and (3)
utilization of discriminatory standards"); Arnett v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 78
F.R.D. 73, 78 (D.D.C. 1978) ("all black applicants , . . for supervisory positions and
all black supervisory employees of the defendant . . . who have applied for employ-
ment or . . . been discriminated against . . . in ways which deprive them of equal
employment opportunities on account of their race or color" (footnote omitted));
Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 18 FEP Cases (BNA) 1376, 1378 (D.D.C.
1978) ("all females . . . who have been accorded disparate treatment because they
have been denied advancement on the basis of their sex").
37. See Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 Yale LJ. 868 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Antidiscrimination Class Actions]. "In [the employment discrimination] area
of law, courts do not find a class by molding an aggregate of numerous individuals
into a group litigant by the factual identity of their claims against the defendant.
Instead, a class is determined to exist in civil rights cases because 'discrimination
based on race, sex, or national origin is by definition class discrimination.' The sub-
[Vol. 49
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his claim of classwide discrimination, the members are entitled to
establish that they were individually aggrieved by the defendant's un-
lawful practices.- If the class fails to prove its claim, however, the
class members have not lost their individual claims, as was explained
in Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.?
The class claims were not examined as a mere aggregation of indi-
vidual claims.... Rather, the district court looked to statistical
evidence offered to support the existence of a practice or pattern of
discrimination.... [N]ot only are the proofs different between
class action claims and individual claims of discrimination, but so
are the judgments and their binding effect.'O
The difficulty with this analysis is that Title VII injuries are suffered
by individuals, not classes. 4' In distinguishing between a class claim
and an individual claim, the Dickerson court has split one cause of
action into two. Even though an individual denied a promotion may
establish a violation of Title VII with proof that he was the victim bf a
company-wide policy of discrimination or with proof that he was sub-
jected to the animus of a particular supervisor, that employee has
only one claim, the illegal denial of the promotion.' If in one action
he unsuccessfully maintains that he was denied the promotion be-
cause of the company-wide policy, res judicata will bar a second ac-
tion based on the theory of discrimination by his supervisor. 4
If courts were to require that putative class representatives estab-
lish their representative ability prior to certification, it is likely that
stantive law seems to recognize a distinctive kind of class litigant .... This 'entity
class' is an a priori class that has an autonomous identity apart from and prior to any
jural relationships created between the class members and an opposing party by the
latter's conduct." Id. at 884-86 (footnotes omitted).
38. "A Title VII class action suit presents a bifurcated... proof problem. Initial-
ly, it is incumbent on the class to establish that an employer's employment practices
have resulted in cognizable deprivations to it as a class.... Assuming that the class
does establish invidious treatment, the court should then properly proceed to resolve
whether a particular employee is in fact a member of the covered class, has suffered
financial loss, and thus entitled to back pay or other appropriate relief." Baxter v.
Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1033 (1974).
39. 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 830-31 (citations omitted).
41. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-11
(1978); see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) C'[i]t is clear
... that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the appli-
cant's race are already proportionately represented in the workforce")..
42. Cf. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) C'(a] cause of
action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts
show.... The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence alleged as causing the
same injury does not result in multiplying the causes of action").
43. See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1977) (Title VII
plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain an individual action and a class action
against the same defendant).
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far fewer classes would be certified in the future. Their reluctance to
reach this result is presumably due to the fiequently expressed con-
cern that effective enforcement of Title VII depends on a liberal use
of rule 23.44 The rationale for this belief is unclear. 41 A court's
power to award Title VII relief is found in § 706(g) of the statute,"
not in rule 23." The statutory language suggests that if a plaintiff has
standing to attack an unlawful employment practice, the court can
44. E.g., Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local 30, 549 F.2d 1330,
1333 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[s]ince the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate ... class based
discrimination, class actions are favored in Title VII actions for salutary policy
reasons"); Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976)
("[b]ecause [Title VII ] attacks classbased discrimination, it is particularly appropriate
that suits to remedy violations of the Act be brought as class actions"), aff'd sub
nom. United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Rich v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[c]lass actions are generally appropriate
in Title VII employment discrimination cases [because such actions] seek to enforce
fundamental constitutional principles"). But see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring)
("[o]ver-technical limitation of classes by the district courts will drain the life out of
Title VII"). One appellate court has suggested that an additional reason for allowing
class actions is to allow prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys "to receive fees commensurate
with time and effort expended on what often are complex and difficult litigations."
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975). Section 706(k) of Title VII, however, authorizes courts to award attor-
neys fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). Nothing in the
statute prevents a court from fully compensating the attorney for a prevailing Title
VII plaintiff who has brought an individual action. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 889-91 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), is sometimes
cited as authority for the proposition that a civil rights plaintiff may invoke rule 23
for the purpose of acting as a "private attorney general." E.g., Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). Although the Newman plaintiff represented
a class, nothing in the opinion suggests that his status as a "private attorney general"
was dependent on that fact. Rather, it appears that his status reflected that he was
seeking an injunction against racially discriminatory conduct. Plaintiffs who had not
brought class actions have been allowed to seek broad injunctions under civil rights
legislation. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Traffi-
cante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1971); cf. Allen v. State Board of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (individual plaintiff claiming to have been denied
rights guaranteed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowed to seek broad injunctive
relief).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(g) (1976). "If the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment prac-
tice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay ...or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate." Id.
47. Contra, Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 704-05.
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enjoin it despite his inability to represent a class.41 Moreover, if a
plaintiff lacks standing to attack a practice, he cannot acquire that
standing by using rule 23.41 Article III of the Constitution limits the
breadth of the attack a Title VII plaintiff can mount, and rule 23
cannot broaden it.5° The power to enforce the prohibitions of Title
VII is, therefore, not dependent on the use of rule 23."'
48. Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1978);
Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1260-62 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 936
(1974); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied. 376 U.S.
910 (1964). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972); Gurman-
kin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1132, 1136 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Rosario v. Rockerfeller, 410
U.S. 752, 759 n.9 (1973); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962). Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
50. In fact, a plaintiff may have standing to attack more practices in his own right
than he can on behalf of a class. In Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977), the court held that a white woman's interest
in working in a desegregated workforce gave her standing to challenge her em-
ployer's alleged policy of denying employment to blacks, Spanish-surnamed Amer-
icans, and women. It then remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether she could also qualify as a rule 23 representative for each group. Id. at 470.
It is not inconceivable that the district court might, on remand, be reluctant to treat
her as spokesman for persons of a different race and national origin, in spite of her
Article III standing. See Beck v. Mather, 417 F. Supp. 648, 649-650 (W.D. Va.
1976). Compare Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.D.C. 1976)
(black employee has standing to complain of discrimination against black applicants
for employment) with General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 331 (1980) (plaintiff cannot represent both applicants and employees in the same
employment discrimination suit when potential conflicts of interest between the two
groups arise).
51. Indeed, the use of rule 23 may hinder enforcement of the statute. Resolution
of the claim that enforcement is needed must await resolution of the collateral issue
of whether certification is appropriate. Compare A. Miller, An Overview of Federal
Class Actions: Past, Present and Future 60 (1977) ("the certification question is an
extremely difficult one and often takes two or more years to resolve") with 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(f)(5) (1976) (statute suggests that cases should be tried within 120 days after
joinder of issue). Conscientious class representatives, concerned with the danger of
overlooking the individual claims raised by the class allegations, may choose to attack
fewer practices than they would if they were freed of the burden of protecting the
rights of individuals. Finally, when a class representative fails to prevail, the doctrine
of res judicata may bring all subsequent enforcement efforts to a halt. See EEOC v.
Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264, 1268 (5th Cir. 1978). One commentator has re-
cently suggested that broad injunctive relief is more effective in class actions than in
individual actions because class members are able to initiate contempt proceedings
themselves, while third party beneficiaries of a decree would have to depend on the
named plaintiff. Note, The "Need Requirement": A Barrier to Class Actions Under
Rule 23(b)(2), 67 Geo. L.J. 1211, 1233 (1979). Under modern theories of estoppel,
however, it is unlikely that the third-party beneficiary of an injunction will find the
need to commence a new action anything more than a minor nuisance. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (a plaintiff can seek to estop a defendant
from relitigating issues that the defendant previously litigated and lost in an earlier
action involving another plaintiff).
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Class certification is necessary only if the multiple victims of an
unlawful employment practice are to be made whole. Although an
employee may have standing to seek broad injunctive relief against
employment practices that have aggrieved him, it is doubtful that he
can also demand that his employer award damages to other victims
aggrieved by the same practices.5" If those persons are to be
awarded individual relief, they must come before the court as party
litigants. Rule 23 is a way of bringing them into the litigation in that
capacity. If they are before the court, however, its judgment must
bind them. Successful efforts to avoid binding them can only create
spurious class actions.
B. The Limits on a Court's Power to
Bind Class Members
If the purpose of certifying a class is to bind class members, an
action should not be treated as a class action unless the members of
the class will be bound. Without the binding effect of the class action
judgment, the defendant should not be forced to litigate against per-
sons who are free to reject an unfavorable result. A certifying court,
however, cannot ensure the binding effect of its own judgment. Res
judicata is an affirmative defense that must be raised and decided in
the context of a second lawsuit."' When a court certifies a class, it
merely states its belief that other judges are not likely to upset the
judgment that will eventually be entered." If that belief turns out to
be erroneous, the court will have created a situation in which "mem-
bers of the claimed class [can] await . . .final judgment on the merits
in order to determine whether participation [will] be favorable to
their interests." m
To evaluate the likelihood that future courts will deny absent class
members their day in court, a judge contemplating certification
should take at least two considerations into account. First, dissatisfied
class members may well command a later judge's sympathy in their
efforts to evade the original judgment. Second, it is an established
principle of due process that "the judgment in a class action will bind
52. Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1296 (8th Cir. 1979); see Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975).
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
54. "It should be noted that the binding force of a particular action cannot be
determined accurately by the court which hears the class suit, for that court is ill-
equipped to test the adequacy of the representation of absent class members, the
sufficiency of notice given, or even the general fairness of the proceeding. Since
these questions can best be answered realistically with respect to a particular person,
the ultimate effect of the class action judgment will be determined when it is intro-
duced in a subsequent action to bind persons not parties to the original action." Book
Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1060 (1954).
55. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
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only those members of the class whose interests have been ade-
quately represented by existing parties to the litigation. '
The sympathy with which former members of Title VII class ac-
tions are likely to be heard in collateral attacks on adverse judgments
stems from both the nature of Title VII classes and the national policy
underlying the statute. Title VII classes are usually certified under
rule 23(b)(2),5 and members are generally held to have no right to
opt out of the class,n or even to receive notice that the class action
has been brought.- Therefore, when a Title VII class member seeks
to relitigate an issue raised by the class complaint, he is likely to be
in the position of being able to complain that he had never heard of
the previous proceedings until the defendant pleaded res judicata in
his action.61 If the plaintiff has alleged a good cause of action, no
conscientious federal judge can be expected to refuse him an oppor-
tunity to substantiate the claim that he has been denied the basic
56. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961).
57. E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 1977); Cross
v. National Trust Life ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir. 1977); Romasanta v.
United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub non. United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Society for Individual Rights, Inc.
v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522
F.2d 333, 341 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48
(4th Cir. 1975). But see Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v.
American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974). See generally Antidiscrimination Class Actions, supra note 37.
58. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 n.7 (5th Cir.
1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Members of rule 23(b)(2) classes have been denied leave to opt
out of class actions that had been settled by the representative plaintiffs on terms
that the dissenting members thought were unfair. See Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 20
FEP Cases (BNA) 944 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Rogers v. United States Steel Corp., 17
FEP Cases (BNA) 1761 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry., 318 F.
Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 897 (1971).
59. E.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, IAM, 565 F.2d 1364, 1373 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d 385, 3S6 (9th
Cir. 1977); Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 764 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975); see Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186-87 (D.D.C. 1976), affd
on other grounds, 431 U.S. 864 (1977). But see Johnson v. General Motors Corp.,
598 F.2d 432, 436-38 (5th Cir. 1979) (right to notice if backpay is sought); Lewis v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 351 (E.D. Va. 1976) (right to prejudgment
notice required by due process), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 577 F.2d
1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
60. See Grigsby v. North Miss. Medical Center, Inc., 586 F.2d 457, 461 (5th
Cir. 1978) ('This class was certified under Crule](b)(2), without notice ... [or an]
opt-out privilege .... Therefore, the propriety and adequacy of representation
accorded to absent class members . . . should be critically evaluated before their
rights are foreclosed.').
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rights guaranteed by Title VII merely because the defendant assures
the court that someone else has already litigated his claim for him.
Any doubts in such a case are likely to be resolved in favor of hearing
the claim on the merits.6'
Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc.,6" a Title VII action brought on behalf
of black seasonal workers of a tobacco company, illustrates the point.
Philip Morris pleaded that the previous decision in Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc.' acted as a bar against the Lewis litigation, Quarles had
been a Title VII action on behalf of all blacks employed by the same
defendant. Although the class representative had prevailed, the
Quarles court had specifically found that the seasonal workers had not
been among the victims of race discrimination and had denied them
relief.6" The Lewis court characterized Quarles as "one of the
monumental decisions in the area of Title VII law," ' yet refused to
defer to the Quarles court's judgment on the seasonal workers'
claims. "Although the class in Quarles did include [seasonal] em-
ployees, indeed the named plaintiffs in that case were former
Iseasonal] employees who had transferred to [permanent status], the
claims of the [seasonal] employees were seemingly lost in the breadth
and ambition of the class's overall interest."6 The Lewis court,
therefore, rejected the affirmative defense because "the interests of
the seasonal employees of Philip Morris were not satisfactorily ad-
vanced and litigated" 67 in the Quarles action. Consequently, those
employees were entitled to their own day in court as a matter of due
process. "
61. It has been suggested that courts should be slower to accord class action
judgments res judicata effect when fundamental rights are involved. Developments in
the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1407-08 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Class Actions].
62. 419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
577 F.2d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
63. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
64. Id. at 519.
65. 419 F. Supp. at 351.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 352.
68. Id.; see Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Stevenson, the court refused to bar a Title VII class action on the basis of an
earlier class action judgment because -[a] careful reading of the . . . transcript" of
the earlier proceedings convinced it that the issues that the absent class members
were seeking to litigate had been presented to the first court "only as a background"
to the claims that were of concern to their class representatives. Id. at 111. In the
Fifth Circuit, a class representative who fully presents the claims of class members at
trial may deny the defendant res judicata by simply declining to appeal an unfavor-
able judgment. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1973); accord,
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1175-80 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
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Clearly, the certification of a class is a chancy proposition at best.'
A trial court's ability to ensure that class claims resolved in the defen-
dant's favor remain resolved is limited to its ability to predict the
future course of events and the reaction of other judges to those
events. Any perceived failure of the representative class plaintiff to
discover and present facts relevant to the claim of a particular mem-
ber or to press that member's claim will enable that member to re-
pudiate the judgment if he is not satisfied with the results.
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.' is one of man), illustrations of the
tendency of courts to certify Title VII classes without apparent con-
cern for the need to bind class members and the attendant difficulties
and potential unfairness in doing so to absent class members and de-
fendants. The plaintiff, a former employee of a chain of grocery
stores, brought his action on behalf of all blacks "who are employed,
have been employed, or might have been in the past or will in the
future be employed by [defendant] Safeway . . . in its various
wholesale, retail, and distribution centers throughout ...
Colorado.' 71 He alleged on his own behalf that he had been initially
denied employment because of his race, and that, after finally being
hired, he was denied training and ultimately discharged for the same
reason.72 On behalf of the class, he alleged that the employer gener-
ally discriminated in hiring, training, and firing, and that three specific
policies were illegalY3 The trial court certified the class, apparently
because "nothing in the record suggest[ed] that plaintiff has failed to
meet any one of [the] standards" of rule 23(a).-' The class was later
narrowed to blacks employed at, or discharged from, the Denver
warehouse.
At trial, the plaintiff sought to establish his own claim with evi-
dence that the supervisor responsible for his discharge was racially
69. It may have been a recognition of the dificulty of predicting whether class
members will be bound that led the Supreme Court to admonish a trial court to
'stop, look, and listen' before certifying a class in order to adjudicate consitutional
claims." Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977).
70. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 266.
72. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
73. Id. at 475-77. The offending policies were the defendant's use of an employee
referral system for recruitment, its prohibition against transfers between its ware-
houses and retail stores, and its use of work experience as an employment require-
ment. Id.
74. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 83, 87 (D. Colo. 1971). The
court acknowledged that the burden of establishing the appropriateness of certifica-
tion is on the plaintiff, but determined that burden had been met by showing that an
EEOC investigation had resulted in a conclusion that there was probable cause to
believe that the plaintiff's charges were true. Id. at 87.
75. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
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prejudiced,76 and the claims of the class members with statistical evi-
dence. He established his own right to relief, but failed to prove any
class claims.77 In fact, the court dismissed the training claim because
"[t]he record [was] devoid of evidence on this claim."" The plaintiff
then appealed, seeking further relief for himself and certification of
the original class alleged in the complaint.7 9
Not surprisingly, the prevailing defendant did not challenge the
trial court's certification order, and the appellate court only consi-
dered the propriety of expanding certification. The trial record,
however, set out several reasons for questioning the propriety of
treating the named plaintiff as a respresentative of any class., A fu-
ture court, faced with a class member's request for an opportunity to
present testimony in support of his own claim of discrimination,
might be expected to demand stringent proof that the Taylor
plaintiff's decision to rest the class claims on statistical evidence was
the product of vigorous advocacy rather than a lack of knowledge,
industry, or resources. Plaintiff's unwillingness to risk his own claim
on statistical evidence, however, may make such a showing difficult.
Moreover, his apparent abandonment of the training claim at trial
and of other general claims on appeal suggests a casual approach
to his fiduciary obligations that may undercut any claim the defendant
later makes that he vigorously protected the interests of the class
members at trial.
The court of appeals, however, did not approach the issue in these
terms. In its view, "[s]ince [the plaintiff] . . .failed to show the exist-
ence of any discriminatory employment practices by Safeway outside
the frozen food warehouse or the existence of any similarly aggrieved
... employee outside the warehouse, the trial court had no alterna-
tive than to limit his class claim to warehouse employees."" Fur-
thermore, the court affirmed the judgment against the class on the
merits. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the trial court's judg-
ment might not bind other blacks with claims against the Safeway
warehouse. The trial court's adverse judgment on the merits 2
76. Id. at 471-74.
77. Id. at 475-77.
78. Id. at 476.
79. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
80. In Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977), the Supreme Court appears to
have vacated a certification order sua sponte. See id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See also National Assn. of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551
F.2d 340, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
81. 524 F.2d at 270.
82. "It is, of course, far better to utilize appropriate procedures at the first trial,
then to throw the burden upon the [class members] who, in the face of a seemingly
valid judgment directly on the matter in controversey, must attempt to regroup as a
subclass and argue, after-the-fact, that they were not adequately represented." Lewis
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apparently bars even blacks with claims against the supervisor who
had been found to be racially prejudiced.
The trial court's certification order may make it difficult for dissatis-
fied class members to find lawyers willing to file actions on their be-
half. If such members do manage to file claims ostensibly settled by
the Taylor litigation, however, some future judge will be forced to
choose between requiring the defendant to submit to a second trial "
and binding the class members by the representation they received
in the class action. That future court's resolution of its dilemma is
uncertain; it could rule that the Taylor judgment is either the final
resolution of the claims of the dissatisfied class members, or merely a
procedural complication to be eliminated before hearing the merits of
their case. When a court certifies a class, however, "it is contem-
plated that all members of the class will be bound by the ultimate
ruling on the merits."' If a court cannot with some degree of assur-
ance determine whether the putative representative will speak for
each of the individual class members, that court cannot find that the
requirements for certification have been satisfied and, therefore, can-
not certify the class.
II. CASTING THE NET: PLEADING A
TITLE VII CLAss ACTION
If the purpose of a class action is to determine with finality the
claims of class members, the sweep of many Title VII class action
complaints can only be termed breathtaking. In the Taylor case, for
example, the plaintiff alleged that he could represent all blacks in the
State of Colorado who had, have, or will have Title VII claims against
the defendant involving hiring, training, or firing.' Even a cursory
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and reman-
ded on other grounds, 577 F.2d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1089 (1979).
83. The defendant would, of course, have had to prepare complete defenses to
each class member's claim at the first trial unless he had determined before trial that
some claims would not be seriously pressed.
84. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
85. Stated otherwise, the class allegations of the Taylor complaint were an aver-
ment that the named plaintiff believed that his lawsuit would be the last action
brought against the defendant in Colorado for violating Title VII in the hiring, train-
ing, or firing of blacks. See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 203, 266-67
(10th Cir. 1975). A number of courts have specifically condoned the practice of in-
cluding persons in a class whose claims will arise in the future. E.g., Phillips v. Joint
Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1981); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). In Gore v.
Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977), the court of appeals, sua sponte, redrafted a
class definition reading: "all other blacks who have been denied equal access to hous-
ing under the defendant's control" to read: "all blacks who, in the future, may be
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review of the reported cases, however, suggests that the Taylor
plaintiff's proposed undertaking was relatively modest. Many putative
class representatives do not limit their Title VII attacks to specific
kinds of discrimination. Rather, they allege a willingness to litigate
every Title VII claim of any person in a protected group against a
particular employer." Because the allegations in class action com-
plaints are subject to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 7 it is worth examining precisely what a plaintiff and his
attorney allege they can do when they file a class action complaint,
and why they are required to make the allegation at the time of filing
instead of when they move for certification.
A. The Commitment Inherent in an Under-
taking to Represent a Title VII Class
When a plaintiff alleges that he can represent a rule 23 class, he
necessarily claims that he can satisfy the rule 23(a)(4) requirement
that he "adequately represent the interests of the class." He is, there-
fore, volunteering to serve in a fiduciary capacity.-' The plaintiff's
denied equal access to housing under the defendant's control." Id. at 166 (emphasis
added). Yet, it is difficult to see how a claim against a defendant can be barred by
res judicata before it arises. See Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc., 549 F.2d 396, 397 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
86. E.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 861-62 (8th
Cir. 1978) (action by two women against major insurance company on behalf of a
nationwide class of past, present, and future female employees and applicants for
employment, alleging discrimination in terms broad enough to encompass any Title
VII claim any woman might have against the defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913
(1979); Williams v. TVA, 552 F.2d 691, 693 (6th Cir. 1977) (large, multi-state em-
ployer sued on behalf of "all blacks presently employed by [the defendant], or
formerly employed and presently laid off, who have allegedly been discriminated
against on the basis of race"); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 701 (5th Cir. 1973)
(action on behalf of "all blacks in Alabama similarly situated" with employment
discrimination claims against any of 17 federal agencies employing persons in the
state of Alabama), rev'd en banc per curiam, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 471-73
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (action by eleven plaintiffs in an "across-the-board" challenge to
discrimination on behalf of all past, present, and future employees and applicants for
employment who are women, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans in
defendant's "San Francisco Retail Division Stores (excluding meat department em-
ployees)," a division consisting of over 200 retail stores "from the Oregon border
south to King City, California, and from the Pacific Coast inland approximately 35
miles"); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 16 FEP Cases (BNA) 242, 243
(D.D.C. 1977) (sex discrimination class action on behalf of "all females who have
been employed, who will be employed and who are currently employed by USPS,
and all females who have sought or will seek employment with USPS").
87. The rule states, in pertinent part, that "[tihe signature of an attorney [on a
pleading] consititutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
88. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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attorney must ensure that this fiduciary obligation is met' and thus
shares his client's obligations.' Because the individual class mem-
bers are to be bound by the court's judgment, the fiduciary obligation
runs to each class member individually rather than to the class as a
whole.91 Therefore, when a lawyer files a class action complaint, he
is asking the court to create something akin to an attorney-client rela-
tionship between him and each member of the class.,- At least one
court has suggested that such relationships are subject to the profes-
sional canons governing the relations between attorneys and their
clients, including the requirement that attorneys "refrain from repre-
sentation of multiple clients having 'potentially differing interests." ' '
The potential difficulties inherent in adequately representing the
interests of each member of a broad class are often discounted on the
theory that the class representative has undertaken to prove that the
employer has a policy of company-wide discrimination.' Yet,
although proof of such an extant policy may satisfy the attorney's
obligation to those class members claiming to have been subjected to
an illegal animus,95 the failure to prove its existence will not." A
89. "Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the
named parties, who direct and manage [class] actions. Every experienced federal
judge knows that any statements to the contrary is sheer sophistry." Creenfield v.
Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973).
90. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
91. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 834-35 t9th Cir.
1976); see Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 440 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978) (en
banc), aff'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Quigley v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,
85 F.R.D. 74, 83-84 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74
F.R.D. 24, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Class Actions, supra note 61, at 1592-97.
92. "In certifying a class action, the Court not only confers upon absent persons
the status of litigants, but in addition it creates an attorney-client relationship be-
tween those persons and a lawyer or a group of law' crs.' Kahree v. Western Elec.
Co., 82 F.R.D. 196, 199 (D.N.J. 1979); accord, Amos v. Board of School Directors,
408 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd sub non. Armstrong v. Brennan, 539
F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
93. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 n.4 (9th Cir.
1976); see Chateau De Ville Prod. v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (a class attorney's relationship \with class members is
subject to "Canon 9 [which] provides that 'a lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety"').
94. Herbert v. Monsanto Co., 576 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds per curiam, 580 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1978).
95. For example, if a class representative establishes that it is the uniform policy
of the defendant to restrict women to secretarial positions, he will have thereby
established that every woman who applied for a non-secretarial position was sub-
jected to an unlawful animus. The issue of damages, if any, suffered by each woman
would be resolved on an individual basis in supplementary proceedings. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (19T7). The repre-
sentative will have proven a "critical" element of each woman's claim, id. at 3.35
n.15, and thereby settled the question of the defendant's liability to her. More is not
required, as rule 23(c)(4) provides that "[w]hen appropriate .... an action may be
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finding of an absence of plant-wide discrimination is not inconsistent
with a claim of isolated acts of discrimination'1 or claims of depart-
ment-wide discrimination. A lawyer, when representing an individual
client claiming to be discharged because of his race, does not limit
his advocacy to an effort to show that the discharge was part of a
uniform pattern, but uses whatever evidence is at hand to show that
the discharge was discriminatory.' It is doubtful that the adequate
representative of an unnamed class member can do less if that class
member is to be bound by an unfavorable judgment of the court.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff has filed an "across-the-board" class
action complaint,ai the class will include persons aggrieved by par-
ticular employment practices or job requirements."0' Proof of a com-
pany-wide policy of discrimination is not likely to vindicate their in-
terests, for such claims do not usually turn on the employer's overall
attitude toward minorities or women, but must be established
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(4); see Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479-81 (1980).
96. "It is tidy, convenient for the courts fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and
dandy for the employees if their champion wins. But what of the catastrophic con-
sequences if the plaintiff loses and carries the class down with him, or proves only
such limited facts that no practice or policy can be fbund, leaving him afloat but
sinking the class?" Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126
(5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
97. Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d 827, 830 (3d Cir. 1978); see
pt. IV infra.
98. See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
99. "A lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means permitted by law .... ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility DR 7-101(A),
100. "The 'across-the-board' approach has been defined as permitting any person
'claiming to be aggrieved by any particular discriminatory employment practices of
an employer alleged to be part of an overall pattern of class based discrimination to
sue to end all forms of discrimination by that employer against the class."' Rosario v.
New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Groves v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 433 F. Supp. 877, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1977)) (emphasis
added).
101. E.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-87 (1979)
(employer's refusal to hire methodone users); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
332-36 (1977) (height and weight requirements); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy benefits from health coverage plan);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-34 (1971) (use of written examinations
and high school diploma requirement); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 64-65 (4th
Cir. 1978) (discipline of firemen for traffic accidents); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
523 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (8th Cir. 1975) (refusal to hire persons with arrest record);
Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (preference for
attorneys with recent legal experience); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271,
1272-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspension for failure to pay debts); Wallace v. Debron
Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1974) (discharge for garnishment); Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972) (requirements that appli-
cants for pilot trainee position have completed 500 hours flight training).
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independently. 2 This entails proving that the practice or require-
ment under attack either was instituted for the purpose of discrimina-
tion against a group protected by Title VII "03 or has the effect of
denying them employment opportunities and cannot be justified by
business necessity. " Because a particular practice or requirement
may be lawful when used to fill one position but not another,10 an
undertaking to represent all persons with claims against even a single
practice or requirement may produce an extremely complicated
lawsuit.'16 Yet, an allegation that the class representative can repre-
sent an across-the-board class is an averment that the judgment %%ill
bind every person who might have a claim against any requirement
or practice of the defendant, as well as every person who claims to
have been subjected to an unlawful animus. This allegation is neces-
sarily frivolous in all but the most unusual cases. It, in effect, would
require the plaintiff to challenge every personnel decision made by
the employer adversely affecting any member of the class, every
practice of the employer that might have worked to the detriment of
a class member, and every job requirement of the employer that a
class member was unable to meet.' °
102. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978) CThis case
did not involve employment tests . . .or particularized requirements such as ...
height and weight specifications . . . and it was not a 'pattern or practice' case ....
(citations omitted)); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14
(1973) ("We note that the issue of what may properly be used to test qualifications
for employment is not present in this case.").
103. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356
(1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-37 (1976).
104. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
105. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F.
Supp. 873, 901-02 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (high school diploma a valid requirement for
police officers but not for firemen).
106. See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1972) (When "the plaintiff
contends that a test serves to discriminate in 20 job categories, it would be unreason-
able to require the employer, in a single law suit, to show that the test accurately
predicts performance in each.").
107. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). In Pettway, an action %as brought in 1965 as an
across-the-board class action on behalf of 2,242 blacks employed at one plant. Thir-
teen years later, it was before the Fifth Circuit for the fourth time, by virtue of an
appeal by dissident members of the class who were dissatisfied with a court-approved
settlement of some issues, and a decree disposing of others. The class attorney
opposed the appeal, arguing that it was not in the interests of the class as a whole.
The court addressed the questions of who makes decisions for a class, the rights of
subclasses to appeal orders favorable to other members of the class, and a review of
the proceedings below. The result was a partial remand for further proceedings.
Noting that it had once expected an earlier 57 page opinion in the third appeal to
resolve the issues in the case, the court lamented the difficulties inherent in resolv-
ing complex Title VII litigation. Id. at 1168. Those difficulties did not lie in Title V11,
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B. The Purpose of Requiring Class Action
Allegations in the Complaint
It is unlikely that many lawyers who file "across-the-board" class
action complaints expect their class averments to be taken at face
value. Most such pleadings are so conclusory in nature and commit
the plaintiffs' lawyers to such manifestly impossible tasks as to be
clearly designed only to serve notice that a class of some sort will be
represented in the action."°  All parties realize that the class to be
represented will be described at a later stage in the case-after the
plaintiff has been able to conduct his discovery.'0 These complaints
do not forthrightly allege an intention to represent a class as soon as
one can be uncovered because such candor might result in a dismissal
of the class claim,"' either for failure to define a class " or for failure
to allege that the requirements of rule 23 are met."2 When a Title
VII plaintiff defines in a complaint a class that he does not intend to
represent and avers that the requirements of rule 23 are met, he is
not reciting ritual language merely for the purpose of form, but seek-
ing to avoid the consequences of telling the truth."'
however, but in the failure of the class attorney and the court to limit the class to a
homogeneous group of blacks with one or a few clearly delineated claims. If a lawyer
were indiscriminately to enter into 2,242 retainer agreements with as many indi-
vidual employees of one employer, each of which committed him to litigate all the
client's Title VII claims, it would come as no surprise if he found himself mired in
conflicts of interest and too busy to represent fully each individual client. A different
result should not be expected if a court appoints that lawyer as counsel for those
same people, on the same terms, under rule 23.
108. Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1311 (4th Cir. 1978); see Smith v.
Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154, 164-67 (D. Kan. 1978) (the judge noted
that briefs filed in support of motions to certify Title VII classes in his court were
form briefs, couched in conclusory language), aff'd per curiam, 624 F.2d 125 (10th
Cir. 1980).
109. "The [plaintiff] has done no more than name the preserve on which he in-
tends to hunt." Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th
Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
110. "[C]lass action relief must be predicated upon a proper class action complaint
satisfying all the requirements of Rule 23." Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447
F.2d 159, 164 n.10 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d
718, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 953 (1977); Washington v. Safe-
way Corp., 467 F.2d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1972).
111. E.g., Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980);Ihrke v. North-
ern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 573 n.3 (8th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 815 (1972); DeBroemaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.
1970); Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 83
F.R.D. 474, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722,
727-28 (D. Neb. 1972); see O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 n.3 (1974).
112. E.g., Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972); Cook
County College Teachers, Local 1600 v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 885 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 432 (9th
Cir. 1969).
113. "An attempt by plaintiff to dismiss an action, or the class action portions of it,
before any discovery has been made raises serious questions about the integrity of
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Something is clearly wrong with this practice. If named plaintiffs
have the right to hunt for classes that they may properly represent in
Title VII actions, their lawyers should not be required to dissemble
so that these plaintiffs may exercise that right. On the other hand, if
the pleading requirements for class actions serve a legitimate pur-
pose, they should be enforced.
Both the defendant and the alleged class members in a Title VII
action need to know at the outset of the litigation whom the pleader
intends to represent and what he hopes to prove. The pleading re-
quirements are designed to convey this information and may be con-
sidered an adaptation of the rules that govern the filing of individual
complaints to the special circumstances of a class action. The class
definition satisfies the requirement in rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules
that the complaint "include the names of all the parties."' The
allegations establishing that the pleader can present certain claims on
behalf of the class in accordance with rule 23 conform to the require-
ment of rules 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) that the complaint set out facts show-
ing that the court has jurisdiction over the claims to be litigated "'
and a statement of the claim that the defendant will have to defend
against." 6 Boiler-plate language in a complaint obviously cannot
supply this kind of information to the interested parties.
plaintiff's attorney. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an
attorney's signature on a pleading constitutes his certification that he has read the
pleading and that he believes there is good ground to support it. An obvous and
important question is what has occurred to change that original belief." Renfrew,
Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and Criminal Antitrust
Cases, 70 F.R.D. 495, 500-01 (1976). To satisfy rule 11, a reasonable and responsible
attorney should make minimally careful explorations to satisfy himself of the prima
facie existence of the class, and their suitability to present themselves in the fiduciars
role of class representative. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
accord, Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154, 164 (D. Kan. 1978),
aff'd per curiam, 624 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1980); Magana v. Platzer Ship ard, Inc.,
74 F.R.D. 61, 78-79 (S.D. Tex. 1977). See also Barnett v. Laborer's Int'l Union.
Local 603, 75 F.R.D. 544, 545 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A well pleaded class action complaint "notifies the
defendants . . .of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who
may participate in the judgment." American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 555 (1974).
115. See National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d
340, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). Although rule 8(ali1
applies to subject matter jurisdiction rather than in personam jurisdiction, the court's
power to bind class members resembles subject matter jurisdiction inasmuch as the
defendant cannot waive the power to bind class members. See note 80 supra.
116. "Implicit in [the Supreme Court's interpretation of rule 8(a)(2)] is the notion
that [it contemplates] a statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in sup-
port of the claim being presented. Of course, great generality in the statement of
these circumstances will be permitted as long as defendant is given fair notice of
what is claimed; nonetheless, Rule 8(a)(2) does require that the pleader disclose
adequate information concerning the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from
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1. The Defendant's Right to a Complaint Which
Provides Him with Notice of the Claims
Against Him
When an employer is required to answer to any Title VII charges
of any black employee or applicant for employment, he is in the posi-
tion of a taxicab company sued by a pedestrian on behalf of all other
pedestrians injured by the defendant company's negligence. An
allegation of "across-the-board" discrimination is too general to pro-
vide the employer with adequate notice of the subject matter of the
lawsuit. He cannot tell which personnel records to preserve, which
job requirements to validate, or from which supervisors to obtain
statements while they are still in his employ. Any lawyer who has
had to determine why one of several qualified candidates was
selected for a position years earlier, or to establish the validity of a
written examination that is no longer used, will recognize the unfair-
ness of allowing a class plaintiff to identify the claims to be proved
long after the filing of the complaint." 7
Moreover, Congress clearly intended to protect employers from
that kind of unfairness. The limitation periods for filing Title VII
administrative complaints and civil actions are extremely short,"" and
the Supreme Court has made it clear that they are to be rigorously
enforced." 9 Thus, when Clarence Brown filed a Title VII action forty-
a bare averment that lie wants relief and is entitled to it." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 12, § 1215, at 112-13; see Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir.
1979) ("[c]omplaints based on civil rights statutes must do more than state simple
conclusions; they must at least outline the facts constituting the alleged violation");
Martin v. New York State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.
1978) ("[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that a complaint consisting of nothing more
than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a
violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)"); Guse v.
J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir. 1977) (Title VII class action allegation that
defendant's discriminatory policies "'include, but are not limited to"' a particular
practice will not support expanding the litigation beyond the specific practice named
in the complaint (emphasis omitted)).
117. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 25 FEP Cases (BNA) 24, 53-54
(D.D.C. 1981).
118. With certain exceptions, individuals with claims against private-sector em-
ployers have only 180 days to commence administrative proceedings before the
EEOC, and only 90 days after notice of termination of those proceedings to file a
civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f)(1) (1976). Individuals with claims against
federal agencies are allowed only 30 days from receipt of notice of the termination of
administrative proceedings to file a civil action. Id. § 2000e-16(c). The period during
which administrative claims may be filed against the federal government is set by
regulation, rather than by statute, at either 30 or 90 days, depending on whether an
individual claim or a class claim is involved. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.214(a)(1)(i), .602(a)
(1980).
119. Deleware State College v. Ricks, 49 U.S.L.W. 4058, 4060-61 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1980) (No. 79-939); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 100 S. Ct. 2486, 2496-97 (1980); United
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two days after exhausting his administrative remedies, he found his
claim time-barred because the statutory period for filing his action
was only thirty days.'20 Nevertheless, the lower courts' lax treatment
of the rule 23 pleading requirements means the defendant federal
agency may not assume that Brown's claim can no longer be litigated.
If, during Brown's thirty-day period, some other plaintiff filed a class
action complaint alleging in boiler-plate language that he would rep-
resent all the agency's black employees, Brown's claim may later sur-
face as a claim that the plaintiff seriously intends to press. By that
time, the claim will be far more stale than when Brown first tried to
litigate it.12 ' No court has explained why individuals who belatedly
seek to vindicate their rights should be treated more harshly than
class members who have done nothing to help themselves. Nor has
any court explained what policy is served by protecting a defendant
when the claimant himself advances a stale claim, but not when a
rule 23 representative advances that same claim. Without much
analysis, the few lower courts that have considered the problem have
held that the filing of a class action complaint tolls the limitations
period for class members.'2 When the purpose of the complaint is to
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); Electrical Radio & Mach. Work-
ers, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see Great Am.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979) (plaintiff %ith EEO
claim cannot proceed under an alternate statute because "It]he short and precise
time limitations of Title VII would be grossly altered" (footnote omitted)).
120. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1976).
121. See Eastland v. TVA, 553 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985
(1977). The Fifth Circuit sustained dismissal of the claims of four co-plaintiffs whose
claims were time-barred, id. at 367-68, but noted that they could not be precluded
from participating in the lawsuit as unnamed members of a class if other co-plaintiffs.
who had filed timely civil actions, could qualify as class representatives. Id. at 373
n.21.
122. E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1161, 1171 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); NAACP v. City of Corinth, 83 F.R.D. 46. 57 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
The only extended discussion of the problem is found in Green v. United States
Steel Corp., 481 F. Supp. 295, 299-301 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The court acknowledged
that "[u]nder present law, it is possible for an employer [in a Title 'II class action]
to be faced at trial with claims arising out of events from years past that it may have
had no idea occurred," id. at 300, and "that permitting tolling during the pendency
of a class action may work a hardship on large corporate defendants who are faced
with a task of collecting stale evidence." Id. at 301. It noted that courts created the
problem by permitting Title VII classes to include those who have not filed adminis-
trative complaints. Id. When Title VII classes were first permitted, however, one of
the justifications was that "when any [administrative] charge is filed and a proper suit
follows which fairly asserts grievances common to the class to be afforded relief...
[t]here can be no claim of surprise [by the defendant] in such a situation." Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969). Thus. although class ac-
tions were once justified on the theory that they would not deprive the defendant of
timely notice of the claims against him, they have become the justificration for depriv-
ing him of that right.
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preserve the plaintiff's right to set out cliams at a later date, a tolling
rule simply allows the plaintiff to use rule 23 as a means of bypassing
the defendant's statutory right to notice.2'3
In view of the purpose of a statute of limitations,124 such a rule
makes sense only when a class action complaint adequately defines
the class that the plaintiff is prepared to represent and puts the de-
fendant on notice that certain claims will be litigated.' Thus, the
Supreme Court, in American Pipe, held that class action complaints
may toll the limitations periods for class members,"' in part because
the result in that case was "in no way inconsistent with the functional
operation of a statute of limitations." 127 The plaintiff's complaint in
American Pipe gave the defendants notice as to the size of the class
and the subject matter of the claim." In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Blackmun warned that the Court's decision should not encourage
"lawyers in a case of this kind to frame their pleadings as a class
action, intentionally, to attract and save members of the purported
class who have slept on their rights." '2
American Pipe was followed in United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald,"9 a Title VII case in which a member of an alleged class
sought to intervene in the action some three years after certification
had been denied. The Court rejected the defendant's limitation de-
fense because the complaint had provided the defendant with the
notice necessary to toll the limitations period by alleging a specific
class of employees affected by a specific employment practice."3
Although the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether a class
action complaint that does not provide the defendant with any useful
123. Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 (5th
Cir. 1969) (after two years of litigation, district court was ordered to define a class so
that defendant could prepare a defense).
124. "'Statutes of limitation ... are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evi-
dence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of R.R,
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
125. See Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1944) (the statute of
limitations "is suspended by the filing of a suit because the suit warns the defendant
to collect and preserve his evidence in reference to it"), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878
(1945). See generally Comment, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations. 48 U,
Chi. L. Rev. 106, 111-12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Statutes of Limitations],
126. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-56 (1974).
127. Id. at 554.
128. Id. at 554-55.
129. Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
130. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
131. See id. at 387.
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information can toll the statute of limitations, it appears unlikely that
it will answer the question affirmatively."-
In courts that believe "[a]n intelligent decision on class certification
requires 'at least a preliminary exploration of the merits' of the
plaintiff's claim," ' the defendant faced with conclusory allegations of
an "across-the-board" class complaint will be denied not only his right
to timely notice of the claims against him, but also his right to
reasonable limitations on discovery. Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery of
"any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action." " Despite the liberal scope of this
standard, the rule does confine discovery to matters relevant to the
issues created by the complaint. A Title VII plaintiff who is allowed
to make overbroad allegations, however, renders the restriction in
the rule meaningless. For example, the two plaintiffs in Wilson v.
Allied Chemical Corp .' brought a broad class action in the most con-
clusory of terms.13 Prior to certification, the plaintiffs served broad
interrogatories involving "information, broken down by gender, con-
cerning personnel and practices for virtually every department and
job classification" at the defendant's plant and requiring several hun-
dred hours for the defendant to answer. '3, Nevertheless, reasoning
that "discovery, and perhaps even a preliminary evidentiary hearing,
mhust precede a court's ruling on the propriety and/or scope of a pur-
ported class action," 3 the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to com-
pel a response to the interrogatories. Obviously, the Allied Chemical
interrogatories were far broader in scope than the matters likely to be
resolved by the court's judgment." They also appear to go beyond
132. One commentator has suggested that it vill be rare for a class action com-
plaint to be too vague to provide necessary information because "[a] number of
federal district courts have adopted local rules requiring any class action complaint to
include detailed allegations of fact as to the size and definition of the alleged class,
and the common questions ... that unite the class." Statues of Limitations, supra
note 125, at 113-114. No case has been found, however, in which a Title VII class
action complaint has been held violative of those local rules. See notes 156-160 infra
and accompanying text.
133. Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1312 (4th Cir. 1978) (footnote omit-
ted).
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
135. 75 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Va. 1977).
136. The district court stated that -[t]he plaintiffs seek to maintain this action as a
class action on behalf of all females who ... have been, are presently, or may in the
future be employed by Allied at its Chesterfield Fibers Plant and Technical Center.
The plaintiffs allege that Allied engages in sexually discriminatory practices with re-
gard to the classification of jobs, hiring, transfers, promotions, discharges, layoffs,
compensation, and by failing to take affirmative steps to alleviate the continuing
effects of past discrimination." Id. at 47.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Certification of the Allied Chemical class was ultimately denied. Wilson v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 249, 256 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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the matter at issue in the certification proceeding- whether "it [can
be] contemplated that all members of the class will be bound by the
ultimate ruling on the merits." 1" Until "the court's ruling on the
propriety and/or scope" of the class, there can be no "subject matter"
against which relevancy could be measured. "'
In seeking discovery "as broad as the allegations of discrimination,"
the Allied Chemical plaintiffs and their counsel were not trying to
prove that specified practices had injured identifiable class members;
rather, they were seeking individuals to represent and claims to pre-
sent. Not every qualification standard for every position would be
ultimately put in issue-only those that discovery revealed were
vulnerable to attack. The named plaintiffs were engaging the defen-
dant in "virtually unlimited and burdensome" discovery until they
uncovered other individuals who had similar claims."' Depending on
one's view of the motives of plaintiffs' counsel, the Allied proceedings
could be characterized as either an investigatory probe of the defen-
dant's practices by a "private attorney general" charged with ensuring
compliance with Title VII, or ambulance chasing through the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." They cannot, however, be characterized
as proceedings commenced by a complaint that provides "the defen-
dant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests." 144
140. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
141. It has been said that discovery is no more burdensome to a defendant in a
class action than in a single action because "'[a]ll evidence showing a policy of
discrimination toward [a] class is relevant to show discrimination against [an] indi-
vidual plaintiff."' Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 719 (1st Cir. 1977) (quot-
ing Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1973)). This would be
true if class membership were confined to persons with claims identical to those of
the class representative. In Title VII class actions like Allied Chemical, however, it is
not unusual for plaintiffs to use their class action allegations as "a sword for discovery
purposes" on the theory that they are representing persons with claims dissimilar to
their own. Lim v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N. D. Cal,
1976).
142. Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 16 FEP Cases (BNA) 242, 245
(D.D.C. 1977).
143. The term "ambulance chasing" may be undeserved in many, or even most,
cases; the term "private attorney general", however, is equally unmerited. For the
most part, counsel for Title VII classes are simply attorneys who hope to earn a fee
by proving a case. To the extent that they are willing to pose as something more-
the disinterested arm of the State-they cannot fairly object if they are also labeled
as something less. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir.
1974) (Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied, 421 U.S 963 (1975).
144. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The burdens imposed on defen-
dants by the unwillingness of courts to enforce pleading requirements are exacer-
bated by the fact that the filing of an "across-the-board" class suit is a game any
number can play. A large employer may face many overlapping class actions at the
same time, with each putative class representative claiming the right to discover the
merits of the same claim even though none has assumed an obligation to litigate the
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2. The Class Members' Right to Notice
of the Pleader's Intentions
Plaintiffs' attorneys are not unaware of the significant financial bur-
dens that ambitious class allegations can create for a defendant. Offers
to dismiss the class allegations in exchange for relief for the named
plaintiff follow many "across-the-board" class complaints." '" Some of
these offers are made in a manner suggesting that the class allegations
were included in the complaint solely to provide the plaintiff with
bargaining leverage. '46 Others appear to reflect a good faith belief
that the plaintiff, although willing to represent any victims of dis-
crimination he can find, is under no obligation to do so until the court
certifies a class.
It is doubtful, however, that a plaintiff who has filed a class action
is entirely free to abandon the members of the alleged class at will.
The Supreme Court, in United Airlines Inc. t. McDonald,"- has held
that absent class members have a right to rely on the class repre-
sentative to protect their interests notwithstanding a denial of certi-
fication by the trial court. 48 Although the McDonald Court was only
claim at trial. Compare Eastland v. TVA, 553 F.2d 364. 365 (5th Cir. (plaintiff claim-
ing to represent "'all past, present, and future black employees and applicants for
employment in TVA's Muscle Shoals, Alabama area operations and facilities, and all
black persons who would apply or would have applied for employment in said opera-
tions but for the defendant's racially discriminatory recruitment and employment
practice or reputation therefor"'), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977) with \Williams v.
TVA, 552 F.2d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 1977) (Engels, J.. concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (conditionally certified class of "-all blacks presently employed by TVA, or
formerly employed and presently laid off, who have allegedly been discriminated
against on the basis of race"').
145. "mhis Court's recent experience has been that the clear majority of pro-
posed Title VII settlements in actions containing Rule 23 class allegations occur prior
to actual class certification and make provision only for the named plaintiff." Magana
v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 62-63 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
146. "Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unman-
ageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it
is a form of legalized blackmail .... The distinctions between innocent and guilty
defendants and between those whose violations have worked great injury and those
who have done little if any harm become blurred, if not invisible. The only signifi-
cant issue becomes the size of the ransom to be paid for total peace." Handler, The
Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum, L. Rev. 1. 9 (1971).
147. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
148. In McDonald, the trial court had refused to certify an alleged class. Three
years later, a judgment was entered in favor of the named plaintiff and several inter-
venors. Before the time for taking an appeal had run, one of the members of the
alleged class learned that no appeal would be taken from the decision denying certi-
fication and sought to intervene for the purpose of taking an appeal herself. Id. at
396 n.1. The Supreme Court allowed the intervention because she had acted "as
soon as it became clear to [her] that the interests of the unnamed class members
would no longer be protected by the named class representatives." Id. at 394.
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concerned with the right of alleged class members to rely on the
named plaintiffs, it is reasonable to assume that the plaintiffs have a
corollary obligation to protect the class members who exercise that
right. That obligation is created by a formal pleading, usually signed
by a member of the bar, announcing that the class members' interests
will be protected. Members of the alleged class would, therefore, seem
entitled to notice if the offer to represent them is withdrawn. "I
Several courts have required representatives of uncertified classes
who want to settle their individual claim to give notice of settlement
to class members who may be relying on them to protect their
interests.1° Surprisingly, however, that logic has not been extended
to situations in which certification of a class alleged in a complaint has
been denied in whole or in part. 11 If a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal
of the class action for purposes of settlement will prejudice a member
of an uncertified class, that class member will be equally prejudiced
by an order denying certification, or by one limiting the scope of the
class to a group that does not include him. Whenever a plaintiff de-
149. "The very bringing of a class action, especially where counsel are known to
be skilled in the field, may deter the institution of suits by members of the ostensi-
ble class. The passage of time may impair or defeat the rights of others thus
deflected from acting for themselves .... [H]aving nominated themselves as class
representatives, both plaintiff and his counsel have undertaken responsibilities, and
triggered possible consequences, that may not now be erased by routine acceptance
of the resignation they now tender. It is necessary at least that some decent notice
be given to those plaintifflisi purported to [be] represent[ed] so that such members of
what was once said to be a 'class' may appear, if they wish, to oppose the present
application, seek to be substituted as representatives or take other steps appropriate
for protection of their interests." Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (footnote omitted). See also ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-
110(A)(2) ("lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until [he] has taken reason-
able steps to avoid forseeable prejudice to the rights of [his] client").
150. E.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978); Pearson v.
Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
912 (1976); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1971); Johnson v. Wentz Equip. Corp., 18 FEP Cases (BNA) 1499, 1501
(D. Kan. 1977); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 65 (S.D. Tex.
1977); Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis,
1975); see Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). Plaintiffs
who accept an offer of judgment after certification of the class they seek to represent
has been denied are "not preclude[d] ... from appealing the denial of certification,
nor excuse[d] . . . from their duty of doing so absent express approval by the trial
court." 578 F.2d at 1110.
151. E.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978); Burgener
v. California Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 555, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Muntz v. Ohio
Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396, 398 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Beaver Assoc. v. Cannon, 59
F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 411, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282,
1286-87 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978) .
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cides to abandon his efforts to have the entire class described in his
complaint certified, those who will be excluded from the litigation
may be prejudiced. This is no less true when the abandonment takes
the form of a failure to press for certification than when abandonment
is the result of a decision to settle the suit before certification."2
Although notice would seem to be a minimal requirement when-
ever a plaintiff chooses to abandon an alleged class, a plaintiff may
not be able to pay for individual notice to every member of a broad
class that has been wholly or partially abandoned.' m Moreover, if
funds are available, locating class members in time to protect their
rights may not always be possible." Because the ultimate cause of
any prejudice is the abandonment rather than the lack of notice, the
best protection for class members would be an end to the practice of
casually pleading class actions on behalf of persons whom the plaintiff
is not sure he can represent. Fairness to class members, therefore,
requires that class action complaints define the class to be repre-
sented in terms clear enough to allow laymen to determine Whether
their interests will, or will not, be protected. The plaintiff and his
attorney should be prepared to press the claim that the plaintiff can
represent all alleged class members, both before the trial court and,
if necessary, on appeal. Pleadings that contain averments that the
plaintiff will represent the interests of the class described in the com-
plaint should simply comply with the requirements of rule 11."
III. DRAWING THE NET:
CERTIFICATION OF A CLAss ACrION
Courts are required by rule 23(c)(1) to determine "as soon as prac-
ticable" whether an action filed as a class action may be maintained as
one. This emphasis on speedy resolution of the certification issue
seems particularly well suited to Title VII actions because the courts
are statutorily required to expedite these actions.' Although neither
the court's power to do justice to the named plaintiff nor its power to
enforce Title VII is at stake in a certification hearing,"s' protracted
152. See, e.g., Garrett v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25, 28 (M.D.N.C.
1978) (class described in the plaintiffs' motion for certification was smaller than the
one they had originally sought to represent, and there is no suggestion in the deci-
sion that notice was sent to class members).
153. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974) (plaintiff
in rule 23(b)(3) class action unwilling to pay for notice called for by that subdivision);
Ross v. Warner, 80 F.R.D. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (notice by publication authorized
in view of the expense of providing individual notice).
154. See, e.g., Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir.
1975) (representative for 99 named plaintiffs unable to locate three for purposes of
discussing settlement), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
155. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5); see note 133 supra.
157. See notes 41-51 supra and accompanying text.
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litigation over the collateral issues involved in certification can inter-
fere with its ability to do either.
One might, therefore, expect that when the initial pleadings fail to
define a class or set out facts establishing that certification would be
appropriate, the court would be inclined to dispose of the class action
issues summarily. The general rule, however, is that certification can-
not be denied on the basis of the pleadings,', even if the class action
allegations are completely boiler-plate in nature and tell the defen-
dant nothing he could not have learned by reading the text of rule
23.159 When a plaintiff has indicated an intention to represent a class
and has recited the requirements of rule 23, most courts will treat
him as a class representative until it has been established that he
cannot represent any class."w
In these circumstances, a responsible plaintiff's lawyer may con-
clude that his client's interests require him to plead the broadest
possible class allegations, even if he has no reason to believe that a
class exists. It is not only clear that "there's no harm in the asking,"
but that tactical advantages for his client may be gained if he does
ask. The putative class representative may be able to induce the
court to abandon its neutral role and join him in the search for
wrongdoing by the defendant.1 6 ' He has some protection from mo-
158. E.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1312-13 (4th Cir. 1978); Walker
v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977); Weathers v. Peters Realty
Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974); see Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d
714, 718 (1st Cir. 1977) (courts may certify class on basis of pleadings but may not
deny certification on basis of pleadings).
159. Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 905-06 (4th Cir.
1978); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1097-1100 (5th Cir. 1975).
160. Perhaps the most remarkable reaction to a conclusory "across-the-board" class
allegation is found in Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978). The
district court had denied certification and then, after trial, found for the defendant.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against the plaintiffs, but held that tile
district court had acted prematurely in dismissing the class allegations before the
plaintiffs had been able to conduct discovery. Id. at 1331-32. Because the named
plaintiffs had been held not to have been the victims of race discrimination, how-
ever, they were ineligible to act as class representatives under prevailing Supreme
Court doctrine. Id. at 1332; see East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431
U.S. 395, 403 (1977). The court overcame this hurdle by remanding "the class action
to the district court with instructions that it be retained on the docket for a reason-
able time to permit a proper plaintiff or plaintiffs, with grievances similar to those of
[the named plaintiffs] to present himself to prosecute the action as a class representa-
tive." 584 F.2d at 1332. Thus, there was, and still may be, pending in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia a Title VII case replete with
docket number, lawyers, and defendant, but lacking a plaintiff or issues to be liti-
gated.
161. "In class actions, particularly in the civil rights field, the general rules on
burden of proof must not be applied rigidly or blindly. The court too bears a great
responsibility to insure the just resolution of the claims presented; it should be
loathe to deny the justiciability of class actions without the benefit of the fullest
possible factual background." Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir.
1975).
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tions to dismiss and for summary judgment. ''  The ability to demand
burdensome discovery while he hunts for a class provides him with
obvious leverage in settlement discussions. A conscientious attorney
might well be expected to hestitate -before sacrificing these substantial
tactical advantages to an abstract rule of pleading. Therefore, the rule
of pleading should be given realistic dimensions so that an attorney
does not gain tactical advantages at the expense of the rights of
others.
A. The Rule 23 Criteria for Certification
Before a class can be certified, the court must find that the re-
quirements of rule 23(a) have been satisfied.1 The language of this
rule, however, provides minimal guidance for distinguishing between
classes that should be certified and those that should not.'' The
meaning of those requirements must, therefore, be inferred from the
purpose of rule 23-the resolution of multiple claims in a single pro-
ceeding. An interpretation of a rule 23 requirement permitting certi-
fication of a class that will not achieve this purpose should be
rejected. -
162. "A court should grant a motion under Rule 12 or Rule 56 in a class action
prior to deciding the certification question only when the challenged claim or de-
fense is wholly lacking in merit and there appears to be no litigatable issue ...
[S]uch a motion may deflect the court from discharging its obligations under Rule
23." Manual for Complex Litigation § 2.11, at 125 (1978).
163. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
164. In commenting on the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, Justice Black protested
that they "place too much power in the hands of the trial judges and . . . might
almost as well simply provide that 'class suits can be maintained . . .whenever in
the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise.'- Proposed Amendments. supra note
22, at 274. Since the rule was adopted, the developing case law has further confused
the situation by suggesting that classes should be certified in Title VII cases when-
ever possible. A decade after the effective date of Title VII, and nine years after the
adoption of rule 23, a district court was able to say, in Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70
F.R.D. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975): "So uniformly have the circuit courts liberally applied
the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3) in favor of class certification, that we are
able to find only six Title VII cases wherein a circuit court has either affirmed a
district court's denial of a class certification or narrowed a district court's definition of
a class." Id. at 386.
165. "[I]f an action satisfies all the requirements in Rule 23(a), the parties comply
with the notice provisions in the rule, and the court properly exercises its powers
under subdivision (c) and (d) so that the case is handled in a fair and efficient man-
ner, it is highly likely that all the prerequisites for giving the decree binding effect
are present." 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 17. § 1789, at 177.
1981] 935
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
1. Numerosity
Subdivision (a)(1) requires that the members of a class be so
numerous that joinder is "impracticable." 6 The numerosity require-
ment reflects the desire to conserve judicial resources by avoiding
multiple trials of the same issue. 67  Accordingly, an individual who
has no claim to litigate should not be counted for numerosity
purposes."M  If he cannot sue in his own name, his presence in the
class adds to the court's burdens in the class suit without minimizing
the likelihood that other actions will be filed. 69 Nevertheless, Title
166. "The cases under Title VII appear to offer no guidance as to the point at
which joinder becomes 'impracticable'.... In class actions generally, the trend has
been to regard classes of approximately thirty or less as not being sufficiently numer-
ous, although there are exceptions in both directions." Harriss v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
167. "[The] use [of rule 23] in claims for damages is justified where the public
policy considerations of efficient court administration outweigh the potential prej-
udice to persons in interest who are not parties to the proceedings, but who may
nevertheless become legally bound by an adjudication as if they were in fact parties
litigant." Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
168. "'The raison d'etre of the class suit doctrine is necessity, which in turn de-
pends upon the question of number."' Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.
1980) (quoting 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 23.05, at 23-149 (2d ed. 1979)), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1981) (No. 80-810).
169. But see Inda v. United Air Lines Inc., 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); Swain v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1977). In
both cases, plaintiffs who had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies were
held not able to sue in their own names even though each was thought potentially
eligible for membership in a class represented by other persons.
Inda involved a suit against a private-sector employer under § 706 of Title VII. 565
F.2d at 560. If a plaintiff who has brought such an action has exhausted his own
administrative remedies, he may represent persons who have not done so under rule
23. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975). The explanation
for this result, however, is not that invocation of rule 23 automatically suspends the
need for class members to exhaust their remedies, but rather that courts may excuse
persons from doing so if no purpose would be served by requiring them to resort to
the administrative process. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765-67 (1975);
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 199 (1969); NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbldg. Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968). Thus, it may be that the plaintiffs
in Inda could qualify for class membership because their claims had already been
submitted to the administrative process by somebody else. But in that case, there
would be no impediment to individual suits. If, on the other hand, the policies
underlying the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine were not satisfied, and
therefore, they could not sue on their own behalf, it is difficult to see how their
membership in the class could be justified.
The defendant federal agency in Swain was sued under § 717(c) of Title VII. 5,17
F.2d at 923. That statute is an "explicit waiver of sovereign immunity." United States
v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 406-07 n.8 (1976). The statute's requirement that plaintiffs
file an administrative claim prior to filing suit is, therefore, a condition precedent to
the waiver of sovereign immunity and beyond a court's power to excuse. Id. at 399;
see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). The Swain court was,
therefore, correct in dismissing the plaintiffs who had not filed administrative claims,
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VII courts rarely concern themselves with the number of alleged class
members who actually could maintain a separate suit. They look, in-
stead, to the number of employees or applicants for employment
whom the plaintiff alleges he can represent.'- Therefore, the plain-
tiff willing to claim that he can represent large numbers of persons is
likely to satisfy the numerosity requirement, even though only a few
of those persons could file an independent action."
Despite the many decisions emphasizing the need to construe the
requirements of rule 23 liberally, only a few courts have noted that a
plaintiff's inability to satisfy the numerosity requirement for certifica-
tion does not necessarily mean that the alleged class members cannot
participate in the action. If joinder is not impracticable, it must be
practicable. ,2 When certification would have been appropriate but
for the numerosity requirement, members of the alleged class will
almost certainly meet the requirements of rule 24(b)(2)" for permis-
sive intervention.17 4
2. Commonality and Typicality
Subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) require that there be "questions of law
or fact common to the class," and that "the claims .. .of the repre-
see 547 F.2d at 923, but erred in holding that a plaintiff who had filed administra-
tive claims could represent them under rule 23. See id. at 924. Joinder of those
plaintiffs was impossible for jurisdictional reasons, not just impracticable. See Luns-
ford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 224-27 (8th Cir. 1977); Blain v. United States,
552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977); Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers.
520 F.2d 11, 23-25 (3d Cir. 1975). Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763-64
(requirement that Social Security recipients file administrative claims before suing a
federal defendant is jurisdictional and cannot be waived for class members) with
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 414 n.8 (unnamed class members suing
private setor defendants need not exhaust administrative procedures).
170. Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir.
1977); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 734-35 t5th Cir. 1976),
Waldrip v. Motorola, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 349, 351 (N.D. Ga. 1980). \Vajda v. Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D. 303, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1978), Briggs v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 414 F. Supp. 371, 374 (E.D. Va. 1976); see Cross v. National
Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1977).
171. See Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local 30, 549 F.2d 1330,
1332 (9th Cir. 1977) (when plaintiffs identified 184 potential class members, trial
court that did not find numerosity because many class members' claims would be
time-barred "erred in failing to consider the broad remedial purpose of Title VIl").
172. Utah v. American Pipe & Const. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
173. "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
-.. (2) when an applicant's claim . . .and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2); see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 559-60 (1974).
174. A district court contemplating a denial of pre-trial certification in such a case
may, therefore, order that notice be given class members so that they may inter-
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sentative parties [be] typical of claims ... of the class." ", Taken
together, they seem intended to ensure that the claim of the named
plaintiff and the claims of the class members are so related that the
resolution of the plaintiffs claim will serve as a basis for resolving the
claims of all. Thus, when a former airline stewardess challenges her
discharge on the ground that her employer's no-marriage rule violates
Title VII, 11 her claim would obviously be both common to, and typi-
cal of, the claim of any stewardess seeking to challenge that rule. If
the employer can prevail against one, he can prevail against all; con-
versely, if he has discriminated against one, he has discriminated
against all. No such relationship would exist between the claim of
that stewardess and the claim of other female employees of that air-
line that the height requirements for pilots discriminate on the basis
of sex.IV Proof of one claim is not proof of the other, and it is diffi-
cult to see how one woman's claim could be considered representa-
tive of the other's. Yet, courts willing to certify "across-the-board"
class actions in Title VII cases necessarily determine that such differ-
ent claims do meet the commonality and typicality requirements. "
The Third and Fourth Circuits have recently modified the "across-
the-board" approach by holding that plaintiffs who are employees
may not represent applicants for employment.1 9 The language of the
decisions suggests that the courts reached their conclusions at least
partially because of commonality and typicality considerations. Yet,
vene. The plaintiff's lawyer, who has already signified his willingness to represent
them under rule 23, can do so under rule 24 if the intervenors request his services.
175. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (3). The difference between the two subdivisions is
not clear. Compare Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 42-44 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (equating the commonality requirement with the typicality requirement)
with Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 649 (D.S.C. 1975) (equat-
ing the typicality requirement with the adequacy or representation requirement of
subdivision (a)(4)), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) and Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 268-71
(10th Cir. 1975) (finding the typicality requirement to be independent of any other
requirement of rule 23).
176. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
177. See Boyd v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977).
178. "The prevailing view in this judicial district is that a Title VII plaintiff may
represent a class including all persons affected by an employer's allegedly discrimina-
tory practices, even though that plaintiff has been adversely affected by only one
such practice and in only one department of the company .... Appropriately named
the 'across-the-board' approach, this view finds the commonality and typicality re-
quirements of Rule 23(a) satisfied in recognition that race discrimination is by its very
nature a classwide question." Gramby v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 84 F.R.D. 655,
659 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citations omitted).
179. Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 86-87 (3d Cir.), curt. denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979). See also Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d
1014, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981) (although an employee cannot represent a class consisting
solely of applicants, he may represent a class of both employees and applicants).
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litigants do not have common claims merely because they were sub-
jected to similar kinds of personnel actions. When a black employee
sets out to prove that he was denied a promotion because of his su-
pervisor's prejudice against blacks, he has no choice but to try to
establish an important element of the case of a black applicant who
alleges that the same supervisor denied him employment because of
racial prejudice.' He need prove nothing, however, relevant to the
claim of another black denied a promotion because he failed a
discriminatory examination, or because a different supervisor was
allegedly biased.'8'
3. Adequacy of Representation
Because a principal purpose of a pre-trial certification order is "to
assure that members of the class [will] be ... bound by all subse-
quent orders and judgments," '"2 the adequacy of representation re-
quirement of rule 23(a)(4) lies at the heart of rule 23. If a class mem-
ber's interests are protected during the litigation, the result should
arguably bind him even though he can show that certification was
improper." If his interests were not adquately represented, how-
ever, he has a constitutional right to be released from the
judgment.
In assessing the adequacy of the representation likely to be
afforded class members, courts generally require no more than that
the plaintiff's attorney be competent and that there be no obvious
conflicts of interest within the class."' Certification seldom has been
180. See note 164 supra.
181. Cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 622
(1974) ("[w]here there have been prior patterns of discrimination by the occupant of
a state executive office but an intervening change in administration, the issuance of
prospective coercive relief against the successor to the office must rest, at a mini-
mum, on supplemental findings of fact indicating that the new officer will continue
the practices of his predecessor").
182. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
183. See Garcia v. Board of Educ., 573 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1978). Several plain-
tiffs who were members of an ethnic minority sought to enjoin operation of a deseg-
regation plan that would involve busing of their children. Id. at 6ti-78. The defen-
dants pleaded res judicata because the plan was ordered in the course of an earlier
class action in which the Garcia plaintiffs were represented by the named plaintiffs.
Id. at 678. The court sustained the plea, in part because the Garcia plaintiffs had
been adequately represented in the earlier action by an intervening class of defen-
dants, as well as by other intervenors who had opposed the Garcia plaintiffs' certi-
fied representative. Id. at 679-80.
184. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961).
185. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Stalling v. Califano, 86 F.R.D. 140, 143-44 (N.D. 111. 1980);
Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 36-37 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
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denied due to inadequate representation because judges are perhaps
unwilling to evaluate the performances of lawyers who appear before
them. 16 The danger of conflicting interests among class members is
generally discounted because such conflicts are assumed to be un-
likely among persons seeking to end discrimination against
themselves.'87 Thus, subdivision (a)(4) is often found to be satisfied for
no better reason than that a plaintiff has hired a competent attorney
and shares a common racial, sexual, or ethnio identity with class
members. 1
Nevertheless, adequacy of representation problems are likely to
arise whenever a named plaintiff is allowed to represent persons
whose rights to recover are independent and different from his own.
When a black who has failed a written examination challenges that
test, he must, to establish his own right to relief, establish the claim
of every other black who failed that examination for the position. He
need not, however, establish the claims of blacks who failed other
examinations, and may find it to his advantage to concentrate his time
and resources on the claim in which he has a personal stake.' In
186. Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff under
Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 406, 410 n.34 (1973).
Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975), is an apparent example of a court's
reluctance to pass on a lawyer's competence. The Jones plaintiff filed a complaint on
behalf of a class, but failed to allege anything but conclusions of law. Id. at 1097. He
moved for certification on the basis of answers to interrogatories, but neglected to
introduce those answers into evidence. Id. When the trial court denied certification,
he took an interlocutory appeal but failed to perfect it, thus requiring the appellate
court to find an alternate basis for exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 1094-97. The appel-
late court then concluded that the plaintiff's failure to show in his initial pleadings
that certification was appropriate was not a sufficient basis for concluding, as a matter
of law, that certification was inappropriate and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Id. at 1098-99.
187. "The interests of [plaintiffs] in combatting the sexually discriminatory policies
of the Company surely are coextensive with all female technical employees, whether
formerly or presently employed." Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,
247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); accord, Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co.,
518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723
(8th Cir.), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
188. It is not likely that a Title VII defendant would be successful in a plea of res
judicata if he rested on the argument that the plaintiff must have been adequately
represented in an earlier class action because both she and the class representative
were both women, and the class attorney was competent. Such a "once-you've-heard-
one-you've-heard-'em all" defense would almost certainly be rejected out of hand,
even by the court that certified the original class on essentially that theory.
189. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1980). It has
been held, in a non-Title VII context, that when "it is predictable that a major focus
of the litigation will be on an arguable defense unique to the named plaintiff or a
small subclass, then the named plaintiff is not a proper class representative ....
[M]uch of the [plaintiff's] effort would . . . necessarily [be] devoted to [his] own
problems . . .; this may well [result] in less attention to the issue which would be
controlling for the rest of the class. A representative plaintiff should not be permitted
to impose such a disadvantage on the class." Koos v. First Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d
1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
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the typical Title VII "across-the-board" class action, the plaintiff
volunteers to litigate dozens, or even scores, of claims. It is simply
unrealistic to assume that he will press every claim that the class
definition has raised. Every experienced attorney knows that the rep-
resentatives of such classes spend the time between certification and
trial determining what claims to press in addition to their own. Class
members with claims identical to the plaintiff's are the only ones
assured of representation; the others are dependent on tactical con-
siderations over which they have no control.
Other conflicts between employees are likely to exist in other em-
ployment situations. The Supreme Court has recently warned that a
single plaintiff should not represent both applicants for employment
and employees because applicants, "if granted relief, [will] compete
with employees for fringe benefits or seniority."" Similar conflicts
would be even more pronounced in a class of employees who are
competing directly or indirectly for a limited number of opportunities
to advance. If the class representative is confined to representing per-
sons with claims he must prove to prevail himself, such conflicts are
not likely to affect the representation he will provide. The black em-
ployee who must establish his supervisor's racial bias to prevail has
no choice but to represent the interests of black rivals with claims
against that supervisor. 9' He need not, however, try to establish
that another supervisor acted illegally in denying a potential rival a
promotion, and it may be in his interest to refrain from doing so.
When a plaintiff seeks to represent only persons whose claims he
must prove while establishing his own, the court may reasonably re-
strict its adequacy of representation inquiry to the competency of the
plaintiff's attorney. If that attorney is competent to prove the
plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff's self-interest will ensure that class
members are adequately represented. In contrast, when the typicality
and commonality requirements are construed so that named plaintiffs
may represent persons whose claims may be slighted or abandoned
without prejudice to their own claims, however, those class members
are completely dependent on the plaintiff's willingness to act as a
volunteer champion of their interests. In this circumstance, it is diffi-
cult to see how any court can determine in advance that the class
members will be adequately represented throughout the litigation.'
190. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1950).
191. This will be true as long as certification is limited to the issue of the animus
of the supervisor. Once the employer's animus against blacks is established, the
plaintiff would have to abandon his representative role while litigating the question
of which of the blacks rejected by the supervisor would have gotten the position in
question. See note 95 supra.
192. In the Fifth Circuit, "throughout the litigation" includes appeals, as a class
member who has not prevailed is not adequately represented if no appeal is taken.
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1973). To determine whether a
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Judges who make such determinations may not have stopped to ask
themselves whether they are convinced that no member of the class
should be allowed to file his own suit once the class suit has been
adjudicated. 3
B. The Judicial Criteria for Certification
The Supreme Court, in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez," admonished courts not to certify classes merely on the
basis of allegations in the complaint' Nevertheless, many courts
continue to do precisely that."- "As parties who have allegedly been
aggrieved by some . . . discriminatory practices," the Fifth Circuit
has said, "plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient nexus to enable
them to represent other class members suffering from different prac-
tices motivated by the same policies.'" Employment decisions may
plaintiff will adequately represent the members of an "across-the-board" class, the
trial judge must, therefore, take into account the possibility that his judgment may
itself fragment the class. Should he find for some class members and against others,
he will create a situation in which it will be in the interest of some members to
appeal, while others may be concerned about delaying their recovery or the danger
of provoking a cross appeal. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d
1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
193. One commentator has suggested that because a Title VII lawsuit brought by a
single black may implicate the rights of other blacks, certification is appropriate to
ensure that the interests of those blacks are protected. Comment, The Proper Scope
of Representation in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment on East Texas Motor
Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 175, 194-96 (1978).
It is, of course, true that all black employees have an interest in a suit brought by
one black employee to reform their employer's promotion system-although no
more of an interest than do all other employees. It does not follow, however, that
placing them in a class will make the plaintiff an adequate representative of their
interests.
194. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
195. "We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are
often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions
of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of [rule
23] remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial
or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has brought the
lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real
victims of that discrimination." Id. at 405-06.
196. Gramby v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 84 F.R.D. 655, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 30-33 (M.D. Tenn, 1979); Bernardi v. Berg-
land, 18 FEP Cases (BNA) 1180, 1181-82 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see Newton v. Kroger
Co., 21 FEP Cases (BNA) 110, 113-14 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (commonality requirements
met by plaintiff's claims of wrongdoing; typicality requirements met by evidence that
members of the alleged class had claimed that the defendant had discriminated
against them).
197. Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 835 (1978) (emphasis added). A close reading of the Payne court's decision,
however, belies the argument that the practices in question were attacked as the
products of a single policy. The plaintiffs were aggrieved by their employer's require-
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not be made, however, in accordance with a single policy. The mere
assertion that a company-wide policy of discrimination exists is no
guarantee that evidence dispositive of the plaintiff's claim will also
resolve the claim of another class member.9'0
The Fourth Circuit, in Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,"' held that Rodriguez does not apply to pre-trial cer-
tification orders." The Stastny court's belief that an "[i]ntertwining
of class action inquiry with merits inquiry" was unavoidable,20' led it
to conclude that the certification issues in Title VII cases cannot be
fully determined until the plaintiff's claim has been adjudicated. -" It
therefore thought a trial court may be "completely justified" in basing
its pre-trial certification order on the plaintiff's allegations.' Such
an order would be tentative and subject to revocation if the plaintiff
failed to prove his class claim at trial. Although the court recog-
nized that a "withdrawal of certification may be thought unfair to the
party opposing the class after a full trial has revealed an underlying
failure of proof on the merits of the class claim as alleged," it attri-
buted that unfairness to "recognized imperfections in [rule 23's] de-
sign in this area."' 0 Rule 23, however, was "designed, in part, ...
to assure that members of the class would be identified before trial
on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and
judgments." '  It was the trial court's willingness to allow plaintiffs
ment of high school diplomas for certain positions. Id. at 898. They do not appear to
have made any claim that the diploma requirement was instituted for the purpose of
excluding blacks from those positions. Rather, they established that the requirement
had the effect of eliminating black candidates for the position at a higher rate than
white candidates. Id. at 898-99. When the employer failed to show that high school
graduates were better able to perform the duties of those positions, they prevailed.
"Proof of discriminatory motive . . .[was] not required under [their] theory." Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). They
also challenged their employer's requirement that applicants for other positions have
a college degree and tried to challenge a requirement that applicants for other posi-
tions have a tenth grade education. Each educational requirement %%as attacked in
the same way. 565 F.2d at 898-99. Whatever "nexus" existed between the class
members aggrieved by the three requirements, it was not their need to show a
common injury produced by an underlying policy of discrimination against blacks.
198. See note 91 supra.
199. 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
200. Id. at 277.
201. Id. at 274.
202. id.
203. Id. at 275-76.
204. Id. at 275; see notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
205. 628 F.2d at 276 n.13. The court did not think that withdrawal of certification
would be unfair to class members who had accepted the trial court's certification
order at face value so long as they were given notice that the class had been decerti-
fled. Id. at 275 n.l1.
206. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added); see notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text.
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to act as class representatives on the basis of unfounded allegations
that brought about the unfairness to the defendant, not any imperfec-
tion in the rule.'
Other courts have sought to minimize the risk that tentatively cer-
tified classes will have to be subsequently decertified by requiring
the plaintiff to establish what amounts to "probable cause"-usually
by evidence of a statistical imbalance.' This approach, on its face, is
questionable. Statistical proof of a racial imbalance, however, does
not imply that a single animus or practice created that imbalance. ",,
The fundamental error is, however, the assumption that certification
is appropriate only if the plaintiff's allegations of a policy of discrim-
ination are true. When a class is certified on such an assumption, the
defendant cannot obtain a binding judgment against class members
because the class must be decertified if he prevails.21 1 Whereas the
Stastny court simply bypassed the requirement that the status of the
action be determined early in the litigation, the "probable cause"
courts turn the certification hearing into a mini-trial, thereby allowing
the plaintiff to "obtain a determination on the merits of the claims
advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a class
207. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
208. In Garrett v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25 (M.D.N.C. 1978), the
court proceeded to "review the statistical data in the present case to determine
whether an inference of discrimination exists. If no reasonable inference of dis-
crimination is revealed by the statistics, the Court would not certify a class for an
across-the-board attack. The individual plaintiffs would have failed to show that there
exist questions of law or fact common to the proposed class." Id. at 32; see Vuyanich
v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 431 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Garcia v. Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 270 (N.D. I11. 1978);
I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 78 F.R.D. 549, 554 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Karan v. Nabisco,
Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 404 (W.D. Pa. 1978). After determining that no such reason-
able inference could be drawn, the court denied certification. 81 F.R.D. at 50.
209. If promotion decisions at a plant are made by 100 supervisors, 60 of whom
are unbiased, 30 of whom discriminate against blacks, and 10 of whom discriminate
against whites, a statistical analysis may reveal an imbalance due to discrimination
against blacks. It does not follow, however, that all blacks denied a promotion by any
of the supervisors were subject to a common policy of discrimination. Indeed, on
these facts, the odds are that most of them were not subjected to any illegal discrim-
ination. That evidence, therefore, will not support an "inference that any particular
employment decision . . . was made in pursuit of [an illegal] policy." International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977).
Of course, an imbalance may be so extreme as to be indicative of a plantwide
policy. Id. at 339-40. If, for instance, a company has for many years hired blacks only
as janitors despite numerous opportunities to do otherwise, it would be reasonable to
infer the existence of an unwritten, plant-wide rule. But such "Jim Crow" situations
are rare. In most reported cases, the statistics do not reveal a complete absence of
minority or female employees, but what the plaintiff contends to be a suspiciously
low percentage.
210. "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action . . . whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be
members of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) (emphasis added).
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action may be maintained," in violation of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.211 It has been held that allowing the plaintiff to present
some proof of discrimination is consistent with Eisen so long as either
the plaintiff is forbidden to prove a prima facie case 212 or the defen-
dant is forbidden to rebut the plaintiff's proof.21 Courts employing
this logic miss the point. Eisen does not impose an arbitrary limit on
the persuasiveness with which a plaintiff may prove his case or on a
defendant's right to rebut that proof. Rather, the decision acts as a
reminder that the defendant is not required to answer to the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant has discriminated against class
members until the plaintiff has established that he can represent
those class members. -2 14
C. A Suggested Procedure for Determining
Whether Certification is Appropriate in a
Title VII Action
A certification order is, in effect, a declaration that the court is
satisfied that the outcome of the lawsuit will bind each member of
the class. The order must, therefore, be based on a finding that the
plaintiff will litigate the claims of each class member. Allegations that
the defendant violates Title VII will not support such a finding, even
if they are supported by statistics showing an imbalance in the num-
ber of minorities or women employed by the defendant. What is
needed is evidence that will allow the court to determine what the
plaintiff must prove to prevail and how many other persons have
claims that turn on the same proof.
A plaintiff who seeks to establish a Title VII claim must ultimately
establish that someone made an employment decision on the basis of
211. 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); see notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text.
212. "Plaintiffs re not to be permitted or required to prove their case at this
time, and to determine whether they have established a prima facie case of discrim-
ination would pose the precise dangers mentioned by the Suprme Court in (Eisen].
That high a threshold is plainly impermissible .... Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Rules 23(a)(2) and (b)(2) require plaintiffs to make a factual showing of class-
based discrimination sufficient to provide substantial questions for resolution at trial."
Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citation omit-
ted).
213. See Lim v. Citizens Say. & Loan Assoc., 430 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
214. In a thoughtful analysis of the difficulties caused by what he refers to as the
"presumption in favor of certification" in Title VII cases, Professor Rutherglen has
suggested that the courts continue to certify classes on the basis of the merits of the
plaintiff's claims, but require the plaintiff to establish the validity of those claims
early in the litigation, with sufficient proof to meet the summary judgment require-
ments of rule 56. Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 720-30. As Rutherglen notes, how-
ever, use of the merits in certification proceedings has "no explicit basis in rule 23."
Id. at 736.
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racial, sexual, ethnic, or religious prejudice, or on the basis of a
facially neutral employment practice that itself violates Title VII. 1'
The plaintiff seeking to establish his right to represent a rule 23 class
must, therefore, first identify the motive or practice that he must
prove illegal if he is to prevail. If enough other persons were sub-
jected to that motive or practice to satisfy the requirements of rule
23(a)(1), and if the plaintiff's counsel appears capable of pressing the
plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff may appropriately try to prove that the
motive or practice is illegal on behalf of all of them. The putative
representative of a Title VII class, therefore, needs sufficient discov-
ery, to learn who made the offending decision and, if that person
relied on a facially neutral practice or job requirement, what that
practice or requirement was. He would also need discovery to ascer-
tain how many other employees of his race, sex, religion, or ethnic
background had been aggrieved by that person, practice, or require-
ment. Discovery on the merits of his claim, however, would not be
needed until after resolution of the certification issue.
The probable objection to this approach to certification would be
the preclusion of certification when the plaintiff suspects that the em-
ployer has an unwritten policy of discrimination that can only be
proved at trial. At the outset of such an action, the plaintiff would
possess evidence that he had been subjected to a personnel decision
made by a particular supervisor, but he would normally be unable to
show that the supervisor was in turn acting in accordance with a
plant-wide policy. It might be said that to deny certification in such
circumstances would be to deny certification in precisely those cases
in which it is most needed.
The answer is that rule 23 requires named plaintiffs to establish
their ability to represent class members adquately before assuming
the duties of a representative. Although named plaintiffs often pre-
vail, they also often lose. To certify a class on the possibility that they
may win is to risk forcing innocent defendants into litigation against
represented class members who can prevail against them, but against
whom they cannot win. Moreover, if certification orders are entered
when adequate representation of class members is uncertain, class
members may be induced to rely for representation on those who will
215. "'Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimina-
tion. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred. ... Claims of disparate treat-
ment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter in-
volves employment practices that are facially neutral . . . but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. ...
Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-impact theory."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(citations omitted); see notes 95-102 supra and accompanying text.
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not represent them."1 6 Certification orders impose a fiduciary obliga-
tion on the court to ensure that class members are, in fact,
represented.2' It is difficult to see how that obligation can be satis-
factorily discharged by a post-trial determination that the certification
order was a mistake. 6
Moreover, denial of certification does not mean that a plaintiff is
unable to enforce Title VII.2 9 He may still be able to prove the
existence of an overall policy of discrimination during the trial of his
own claim. 0  If he does, he can seek the same injunctive relief as an
individual as he could have sought as a class representative.?2'
IV. THE DICKERSON DEBACLE: A CONCLUDING
VIEW OF RULE 23
An analysis of a recent series of decisions rendered in the case of
Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp .'- serves to illustrate the effect
of the certification of overly broad classes on Title VII litigation.
Dickerson was a class action brought in June of 1973 by four black
216. The Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of rule 23 is best served if
class members are encouraged to rely on the class representative rather than file
their own actions. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 3S5. 394 n.15
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 757 n.9 (1976); American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). Courts that encourage laymen to
rely on class representatives would appear to have an obligation to differentiate be-
tween those self-proclaimed class representatives who are likely to represent the
class members and those who are not.
217. See cases cited note 13 supra.
218. The Fourth Circuit opined that when a class is decertified after trial, notice
to class members will be sufficient to protect their rights. See Stastny v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 282 & n.25 (4th Cir. 1980). But what are the
class members to do with that notice? If they are permitted to file their own actions,
the defendant will have been stripped of his right to timely notice of the claims
against him for no better reason than that someone charged him with a pattern of
wrongdoing that could not be proved. If their actions are held to be time-barred, the
trial court has induced people to rely on the plaintiffs to their detriment. Although
the appellate court made much of the fact that the trial court's certification orders
were merely tentative, id. at 276-77, it seems unduly harsh to tell a lay class mem-
ber suddenly ejected from the litigation that he should have read the "fine print" in
the court's certification order before relying on the plaintiffs' counsel to represent
him.
219. See notes 41-50 supra and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976); see notes 44-52 supra and accompanying text.
222. 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); 10 FEP Cases (BNA) 1175 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); 15 FEP Cases (BNA) 1800 (E.D. Pa. 1977); 439 F. Supp.
55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated on other grounds sub norn. Worthy v. United States,
616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980); 14 FEP Cases (BNA) 1450 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 14 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1448 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 12 FEP Cases (BNA) 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 12
FEP Cases (BNA) 941 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 64 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1974), 7 FEP Cases
(BNA) 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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employees at United States Steel's Fairless Hills plant. The class was
defined as virtually every black who had, has, or might later have, a
Title VII claim against the Fairless Hills plant or against any of the
unions representing employees at that plant.2" The complaint did
not, on its face, appear to meet the requirements for a class
action.' The definition of the class was overly broad, suggesting a
design to preserve the plaintiffs room to maneuver rather than to
isolate a group whom the plaintiffs and their attorneys were deter-
mined to represent. Moreover, there was no indication in any of the
Dickerson opinions that the complaint alleged a factual basis for their
belief that the named plaintiffs could represent the entire alleged
class, and subsequent events suggest that they were probably unable
to do so. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the plaintiffs fol-
lowed the common practice of simply reciting or paraphrasing the
language of rule 23. If this assumption is correct, the class allegations
amounted to little more than an assertion that the plaintiffs believed
that the defendants had violated the law in unspecified ways, thereby
injuring persons whose identities were as yet unknown. If the trial
court had any concerns about either the ability of the Dickerson com-
plaint to qualify as a class action complaint213 or the need for prompt
action to prevent alleged class members from relying on unrealistic
promises,' however, its opinions do not reflect them.
Six months after the complaint was filed, the court was called on to
resolve a dispute involving the scope of discovery.- The defendant-
employer had objected to the plaintiffs' interrogatories because they
went to the merits of the case rather than "to the question of whether
[the] action should be maintained as a class action," and asked that its
obligation to answer be deferred until after the certification issue was
resolved.m Anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen, the
223. 7 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1318. The class the plaintiffs sought to represent was
"a. all blacks now employed or who might be employed in the future by United
States Steel Corporation at its Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania plant; all blacks who were
employed by the company from July 2, 1965 to the present date, but who are no
longer employed there; and all blacks who unsuccessfully sought employment at the
Fairless Hills plant at any time between July 2, 1965 and the present date; b. all
blacks who are represented ... by defendant labor organizations at the Fairless Hills
* . . plant, ... from July 2, 1965 to the present date." 64 F.R.D. at 353 (footnote
omitted).
224. See notes 108-16 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 145-55 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 145-55 supra and accompanying text.
227. 7 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1318.
228. Id. The logic of the employer's position is easily seen with the benefit of
hindsight. Black clerical workers, among others, would eventually be excluded from
the class. 14 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1450-51 & n. 1. If the claims of those clericals were
not part of the subject matter of the lawsuit, matters pertaining only to those claims
should not be discoverable under rule 26(b)(1). The employer, therefore, had good
reason to object to discovery that went to the merits of the claims of putative class
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Dickerson court held that the employer need answer only "those in-
terrogatories addressed to the class action question which are relevant
and which are not unduly burdensome."2
Nine months later, the Dickerson court certified the entire class set
out in the complaint.an Nothing in its opinion lists the elements of
the individual plaintiffs' claims or indicates why they are common to,
or typical of, the claims of class members. The court's only finding of
fact is that the "plaintiffs have shown a recent enough and a broad
enough experience with defendant's operations to sustain the conclu-
sion that they will be fair and adequate representatives of the
class."" The opinion, however, presents several factual assertions
by the plaintiffs that the court possibly found persuasive: that the
defendant employed 839 blacks; that the plaintiffs were "represented
by counsel experienced in civil rights class actions;" and that the
plaintiffs "[had] no interests which conflict with those of the
class."' 3 Clearly, however, the court did not "[contemplate) that all
members of the class [would] be bound by the ultimate ruling on the
merits." 13 In a later opinion denying a motion to decertify the class,
the court would explicitly acknowledge that "[t]his is not to say that
the presently certified class may not have to be narrowed somewhat
before trial."- Even though the court still did not know whose
claims would be resolved by the lawsuit, it certified the class,
thereby lifting the pre-certification restrictions on discovery. Despite
the ritual assertion in the court's opinion that "[t]he burden is upon
the plaintiffs to show that each of [the rule 23] requirements has been
met," its failure to base certification on any factual findings, 'its
approving reference to the "proposition that 'racial discrimination is
by definition class discrimination,"'" and its preoccupation with the
defendant's arguments against certification all demonstrate that the
court was not asking "why," but "why not."2
members until the court had determined who was, and who was not, in the litiga-
tion. See notes 131-44 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, some months later the
Supreme Court would warn against allowing putative representatives to "secure the
benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it." Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); see notes 22-29 supra and accom-
panying text.
229. 7 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1320.
230. 64 F.R.D. at 353.
231. Id. at 356.
232. Id. at 354.
233. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
234. 12 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1468.
235. 64 F.R.D. at 354 (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 357 (quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Co., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966)).
237. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 723.
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In October 1976, the court narrowed the class to exclude blacks in
management, clerical, and technical positions because the named
plaintiffs -production and maintenance workers- lacked the per-
sonal knowledge of management, clerical, and technical work neces-
sary to represent those employees adequately.m The court also ex-
cluded unsuccessful black applicants because those applicants might
have claims to retroactive seniority that would make them senior to
the named plaintiffs and, therefore, have interests antagonistic to
those of the plaintiffs.m The order provided that the partial decerti-
fication would not be effective until persons to be excluded from the
class were notified that, once excluded, the statute of limitations
would start to run.20
Thus, after two years of litigation, the abandoned class members
were given essentially a nonsuit without prejudice. The defendants
had been forced to defend themselves on the basis of representations
that the named plaintiffs and their attorneys could speak for people
for whom they in fact could not speak. The defendants had been
required to submit to discovery on the basis of those court approved
representations, only to be told that the plaintiffs had made a mis-
take. Any costs they had incurred in developing defenses against
claims that had been dismissed were admitted to have been
unnecessary."u
Moreover, it is not clear that the court could protect the aban-
doned class members from the statute of limitations. By concluding
that the statutory period would not start to run until its order exclud-
ing them from the class became final, the court appeared to assume
that the filing of ant/ class action complaint always tolls the limitations
period for all members of an alleged class. 242 Its authority for this
proposition, Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,m is based on
the rule of American Pipe, which teaches that the limitations period
for class members is tolled when the defendant is given notice of
238. 14 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1450-51.
239. Id. at 1451.
240. Id.
241. See EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 457 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part and remanded, 570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1978). The court awarded
attorneys' fees in a class action suit to a prevailing defendant "because the vast
majority of the [class claims] were abandoned, and because the vast majority of De-
fendant's time and expense was spent before trial in the preparation of a defense to
claims that were ultimately abandoned." The court also found that "those abandoned
claims [were] frivolous, groundless, brought vexatiously, or brought unreasonably."
Id. at 69. In Dickerson, there is no suggestion that the abandoned claims were un-
reasonable. Instead, it was the averment that the plaintiffs could represent the entire
class that was unreasonable.
242. 439 F. Supp. at 68; 14 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1451.
243. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
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their claims.- " Yet, some of the class members being excluded were
ineligible for class membership because the named plaintiffs lacked a
personal knowledge of their circumstances. 2* Thus, the Dickerson
plaintiffs not only failed to provide the defendant with the informa-
tion mandated by American Pipe, but also could not have provided
that information if they had wanted to do so.? Therefore, the stat-
ute of limitations had probably extinguished any cause of action that
the abandoned class members might have once had .2 " The notice
that the court ordered sent to the abandoned class members might
appropriately have included information concerning their right to
seek redress from their representatives if they had relied on the class
action allegations to their prejudice.
After the partial decertification, the Dickerson plaintiffs, in re-
sponse to a pre-trial order, stated that they would prove nine claims
of class-wide discrimination.9 Given the inclusive nature of the
plaintiff's class definition, however, no one could confidently state
that the plaintiffs' listing covered every Title VII claim that every
class member might have against the Fairless Hills plant. If black
employees were relying on the named plaintiffs to establish specific
claims that were ultimately omitted from the listing of issues, those
claimants were now effectively excluded from the class. Nothing in
any of the published opinions would suggest that the listing was
mailed to class members with an appropriate warning.
After fifty-eight days of trial over a period of seven months, the
plaintiffs rested their case, and the defendants moved to dismiss each
of the claims because no prima facie case had been established. For
purposes of requiring the defendant to go forward, the court held
that the plaintiffs had established the first four claims entirely or par-
tially, but granted a motion to dismiss the last five. Additionally, the
court found that about fifty of the class members who testified "had
established [prima facie] individual claims of racial discrimination,
244. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
245. Id. at 561; see notes 123-31 supra and accompanying text.
246. 439 F. Supp. at 83-94.
247. In Green v. United States Steel Corp., 481 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
the Dickerson judge was faced with a suit brought by one of the applicants excluded
from the Dickerson class. The defendants pleaded the statute of limitations on the
ground that the Dickerson complaint did not fairly apprise them of her claim. Id. at
300. The trial court rejected the claim, essentially holding that class action defen-
dants in Title VII cases have no right to timely notice of the claims of individual class
members. Id. at 301; see note 149 supra and accompanying text.
248. The nine claims were "(1) initial assignments of blacks to undesirable jobs; (2)
exclusion from crafts by discriminatory tests; (3) exclusion from first crews and newly
opened facilities; (4) exclusion from promotions; (5) restrictive transfer opportunities;
(6) excessive discipline; (7) failure by the union to process grievances; (8) mainte-
nance of a hostile atmosphere to blacks; and (9) violation of ... [a] consent decree
[entered in another case]." 582 F.2d at 829.
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even though the applicable class-wide claims of racial discrimination
were dismissed." 9 A class claim, according to the court, required
the plaintiffs to "show something more than a small number of
discriminatory incidents affecting a few members of the class," while
an individual claim could be an isolated act of discrimination. 3 '
Thus, the court seemed to impose a kind of numerosity requirement
on proof of a class claim, a requirement to be met at trial rather than
prior to certification."'
In opposition to the establishment of the fifty individual claims, the
defendants argued that the "court's dismissal of a class-wide claim
bars individual lawsuits under that claim by class-member
witnesses.""' Because the court believed its certification order
"must have certainly inhibited many class members from instituting
separate actions, '"' it held "that it must recognize and decide the
individual class members' cases of discrimination, even if the class
claim was not proved." ' ' The issue was then certified for an inter-
locutory appeal.-5
The Third Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that the dis-
missal of the class claims barred the individual claims, reasoning that
the finding of an absence of a practice or pattern of discrimination
was based on statistical evidence and was "not necessarily incon-
sistent with a claim that discrete, isolated instances of discriminations
occurred."- It further held, however, that the lower court could not
adjudicate those individual claims because the claimants had not
moved to intervene in the action, that their claims lacked "the cohe-
siveness and commonality essential to a class action," and that
intervention would be unfair to the defendants because "the class-
member witnesses' testimony was relevant only to the class-wide
249. Id.
250. 439 F. Supp. at 65.
251. This imposition of a "numerosity requirement" on plaintiffs in a class action
was based on an interpretation of International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977). 439 F. Supp. at 65. The Teamsters Court, however, did not
refer to "plaintiffs in a class action." That case was brought by the United States
under the old § 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 431 U.S. at 328
n.1. That statute authorized the Attorney General to bring a civil action when he
"has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of" discrimination. Id. Thus, the Teamsters Court was not con-
sidering the burden of a class action plaintiff, but what the Government had to prove
under § 707 of the Act. The Supreme Court has further emphasized the difference
between a private plaintiff and the government seeking Title VII relief under rule
23. See General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 329-31
(1980) (EEOC may seek class-wide relief without being certified as the class repre-
sentative).
252. 582 F.2d at 830.
253. 15 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1802.
254. 15 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1802.
255. Id.
256. 582 F.2d at 830.
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claim, or, perhaps, the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. ''
What, then, had been accomplished by five years of litigation, two
interlocutory appeals to the Third Circuit, one denial of a petition for
a writ of certiorari, and fifty-eight days of a partially completed trial?
Not much, it would appear. The burden of going forward had been
placed on the defendant as to the first four claims. The defendants
had prevailed on the other five, but only against the class, as opposed
to the class members. If the litigation achieved one of the purposes of
class certification- prevention of a "multiplicity of suits" '-it was
by lulling potential litigants into waiting too long to sue.
The result in Dickerson cannot be ascribed to the work of a reck-
less counsel or an inept judge. In declining to limit their class by
persons or issue, the class lawyers were doing no more than what the
appellate courts have been permitting class representatives to do for
over a decade. In fact, the class attorneys went further in their efforts
to represent the class than is necessary to meet the standards of most
courts. Although classes are often narrowed without the class counsel
doing anything other than arguing that the narrowing is inappropri-
ate, the Dickerson attorneys drew the court's attention to the desira-
bility of notice to class members excluded by its October 1976
order.29 Proof of over fifty individual claims of discrimination con-
trasts sharply with the willingness of many class attorneys to rest the
class members' claims on a statistical showing.-"" Similarly, the court
seems to have applied the case law in a craftsman-like manner, accu-
rately reflecting the law of its circuit. It is fair to say that it was the
court's painstaking evaluation of the results of the trial that exposed
the difficulties of certifying a class with Title VII claims.21' What
makes Dickerson unique is not the problems found when the court
looked beneath the surface of the "class-wide" evidence, but the
court's willingness to expose those problems and try, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, to rectify them.
The underlying cause of the Dickerson debacle is the failure to
recognize that an applicant for rule 23 status is asking the court to
deny others the right to be heard that he is demanding for himself.
The courts of appeal are so oblivious to the implications of certifying
a Title VII class that they sometimes treat the right to serve as a class
representative as the personal right of the named plaintiff.- Yet, the
257. Id. at 831-32.
258. 15 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1802.
259. 14 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1451.
260. E.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); see notes
70-84 supra and accompanying text.
261. 439 F. Supp. at 71-94.
262. For instance, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff who had exhausted his
administrative remedies could represent those under rule 23 who had not done so
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named plaintiff has nothing at stake at a certification hearing; he can
seek full relief for his injury despite the outcome of the certification
proceeding.-
The persons most vitally interested in the certification proceedings
are those whom the named plaintiff proposes to bring before the
court. They are entitled to have the court skeptically consider any
claim that their interests will be fully protected if the court will only
appoint the plaintiff and his counsel as their representative."" Both
the case law and Title VII Iterature have emphasized the need to use
rule 23 to make the courthouse available to laymen who, through a
lack of sophistication or fear of their employer, would otherwise be
unable to redress Title VII injuries. Yet, that same lack of sophistica-
tion may leave them incapable of protesting the failure of a class
attorney to carry out his promises. No one can estimate the number
of people who failed to pursue their remedies against their employer
because they relied on a class action allegation that came to nothing,
or the number who found that the unsatisfactory resolution of a
poorly litigated class action barred their own claims.
The defendant's interests at certification also outweigh any the
plaintiff may have. Under current procedures, plaintiffs are free to
walk away from any problems caused by their class action complaints,
either by seeking decertification or by not pressing the class action.
On the other hand, the defendant in an improperly certified class
action faces a "spurious" class action of the kind rule 23 was designed
because "the right to bring a class action is concomitant to the right to de novo
proceedings in the district court." Eastland v. TVA, 553 F.2d 364, 372 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977). It did not explain the connection between the
right to a plenary hearing and the right to deny someone else such a hearing. In a
non-Title VII case, another court stopped a defendant from inquiring into the ability
of a plaintiff to finance a class action with the remark that "[f]ederal judges take an
oath to 'administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor
and to the rich."' Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 n.3 (10th Cir. 1974). One
somehow doubts that the Tenth Circuit will turn aside a collateral attack on a class
action judgment with a similar statement if it appears that the inadequacy of repre-
sentation was the result of the named plaintiff's financial condition,
263. See notes 41-50 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text. In Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979), the court noted, without apparent concern, that
in Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), it had accepted the
plaintiff's characterization of his action as a class action even though the district court
had never certified a class. 598 F.2d at 436. After the Rowe court had reversed a
district court's finding fbr a Title VII defendant, the Rowe plaintiff returned to the
district court and obtained broad injunctive relief and compensatory relief for
himself-all of which he could have obtained without class certification. The Johnson
plaintiff was a member of the Rowe class who thus received nothing from his class
representative save the need to go to the Fifth Circuit before he could overcome a
plea of res judicata to his own suit. Id. at 436-38.
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to eliminate,2 and at worst, a "strike suit" designed to bludgeon him
into settlement.
If rule 23 is to fulfill its purpose, several working assumptions of
the courts must be changed: that Title VII discrimination is "class"
discrimination within the meaning of rule 23; that there is a meaning-
ful difference between a complaint that does not purport to be a class
action complaint and one that defines a meaningless class and recites
the language of the rule; that precertification proceedings are de-
signed to allow the plaintiff to search for a class he may represent
rather than to allow him to establish that he may represent the class
alleged in the complaint; that the court's decision on certification may
be delayed for months or even years while the plaintiff poses as the
champion of people whom he may not be able to represent; that
there is a connection between the right to serve as a "private attor-
ney general" and the ability to satisfy rule 23; and that a certification
order constitutes something less than the court's personal assurance
to all concerned that he has reason to believe that the interests of
every individual whose Title VII claim falls within the language of the
certification order will be fully protected during the coming litigation.
Abandonment of these assumptions will have a drastic effect on the
use of rule 23 in Title VII cases. Many class actions will not survive
the pleadings stage. Fewer still will be certified. But this is to say no
more than that litigants will not find it easy to persuade judges that
they can present other people's claims for them without their con-
sent.
265. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
266. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
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